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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in the Utah Court of Appeals is conferred by 
virtue of Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The issue brought before this Court is whether the court 
below erred by allowing a joint trust to be revoked unilaterally 
after the death of one of the co-trustors. 
The standard of review is M e novo" for an appeal based 
exclusively on a question of law and this Court reviews the 
decision below for correctness, giving no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions. First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Creech, 
858 P.2d 958, 963 (Utah 1993); Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt 
Paving. Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989); Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 
1988) . 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
There is no Utah statute or case law dealing directly with 
unilateral revocation of a joint trust. However, well 
established treatises do speak on this issue. Additionally, many 
other states have firmly established the principle that a joint 
trust cannot be unilaterally revoked and becomes irrevocable at 
the time of death of any co-trustor. Such cases shall be 
persuasive in this matter. 
Utah lav/ has set forth the requirements for termination of a 
joint trust in Clayton v. Behle. 565 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1977), which 
is analogous. This rule is also supported by other cases, in 
addition to those cited in Clayton, including Sundquist v. 
Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181 (Utah 1981); Ambrose v. First National 
2 
Bank of Nevada, 482 P.2d 828 (1971); Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, 
§ 1007 (2d ed. 1962); 4 Scott on Trusts § 337 (3d ed. 1967). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case centers on the attempted revocation of a joint 
trust by Herschel J. West, Sr. The property in trust was the 
family home of Herschel J. West, Sr. and his first wife, Hazel 
West. The Fourth Judicial District Court addressed this matter 
as it related to the probate of the estate of Herschel J. West, 
Sr. Appellants, "beneficiaries" below, claim the family home by 
virtue of a joint trust created by their parents. Appellee, 
"Personal Representative" below, claims the property by virtue of 
a deed created later by Herschel J. West, Sr., which could only 
be effective if his unilateral revocation of the joint trust in 
question was valid. 
While matters relating to the sale of real property are, in 
some instances, analogous to the case at bar, it should be noted 
that this matter concerns trust property. Often, the 
requirements relating to transfers of property into trust differ 
from the requirements for transfers of property by sale, deed, or 
other conveyance. For instance, the time at which an interest in 
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trust property vests differs from the time at which an interest 
in property transferred by deed is actually delivered. 
The Court may note that this brief will use the term 
"trustor" or "co-trustor" to refer to the person, or persons, who 
have created a trust. However, the terms "settlor" and "grantor" 
are often used interchangeably in case law and may be used in 
quotations. Any of these terms, in this case, refer to Herschel 
J. West, Sr. and/or Hazel West as the creators of the trust in 
question. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The trial court made a ruling on October 24, 1994 validating 
a trust of the deceased containing the home, which trust is the 
subject matter of this appeal. [R. 548]. Subsequently, Personal 
Representative Marilyn West filed a "Request for Clarification of 
Ruling and Enlargement" on November 2, 1995 requesting that the 
trial court clarify its position in regard to the termination of 
the joint trust of Herschel and Hazel West that Herschel West 
attempted to terminate and deed to his second wife, Personal 
Representative Marilyn West, after the death of his first wife 
and co-trustor, Hazel West. [R. 550]. The Court then made a 
second ruling on January 17, 1995 indicating that the trust was 
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valid but that it contained joint tenancy language. [R. 585]. 
The Court then opined 
... upon the demise of one of the joint tenants, the 
surviving joint tenant, Herschel West, had full 
authority over the trust property and exercised that 
authority when he Quit Claimed it to himself and then 
to himself and Marilyn West as joint tenants. By 
making the above transfer he effectively revoked the 
valid trust, leaving the residence in joint tenancy 
with himself and Marilyn West and upon Herschel's 
demise, she became sole owner of the residence. 
The Court then issued a final judgment based upon this ruling. 
[R. 590]. Appellant contests in this appeal this determination, 
ruling and final judgment of the trial court. 
C. DISPOSITION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
In the final judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Guy R. Burningham 
concluded that the trust 
was a revocable trust and contained language to the 
effect that the surviving trustee shall continue as 
sole trustee succeeding to all the powers, duties and 
discretionary authority given to the trustees jointly. 
Therefore, upon the demise of Hazel L. West (one of the 
co-trustees) the surviving trustee (Herschel Joseph 
West) had full authority over the trust property and 
exercised that authority when he Quit Claimed it to 
himself and his wife, Marilyn West, as joint tenants. 
By making the above transfer, Herschel Joseph West 
effectively revoked the valid trust, leaving the 
residence in joint tenancy with himself and Mrs. West 
and upon his death, Mrs. West became the sole-owner of 
the residence by operation of law. 
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In its Final Judgment the court determined that the 
unilateral revocation by Herschel J. West, Sr. of the joint trust 
in question and his subsequent transfer of that property by deed 
to himself and Appellee was valid. While the subsequent deed 
might otherwise have been valid, this appeal raises the question 
of the validity of the unilateral revocation of the joint trust, 
which, if shown to be invalid would also invalidate the 
subsequent deed. 
D. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. The Decedent married his second wife, Marilyn West, the 
Personal Representative of the Estate, who is not the mother of 
the decedent's children, on November 18, 198 9, two years before 
the death of the decedent on December 11, 1991. [R. 526] . 
2. On or about July 18, 1969, the deceased and Hazel A. 
West, the first wife of the deceased and the mother of the 
Appellants, conveyed their home located at 654 East 3750 North, 
Provo, Utah to the children in trust. [R. 524]. 
3. In affirmation of that trust, the deceased and Hazel L. 
West Quit-Claimed to the trust any interest in the home. [R. 
524] . 
4. On or about January 16, 1991, Marilyn West, the 
Personal Representative of the Estate, recorded that deed with 
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the Utah County Recorder. [R. 524]. 
5. Subsequently, Marilyn West recorded the Affidavit of 
Death as Co-Trustee of Herschel J. West as entry no. 1646 in the 
records of Utah County Recorder. [R. 524]. 
6. On or about the same date as entry no. 1647 Marilyn 
West caused to be recorded a Quit-Claim Deed from the deceased to 
the deceased and the Personal Representative as joint tenants. 
[R. 524]. 
7. On October 25, 1994 the Honorable Guy R. Burningham 
made a ruling validating the trust containing the home and 
awarding that home to the children of the deceased and the 
Appellants' herein. [R. 548]. 
8. On November 2, 1994 Personal Representative Marilyn 
West filed a Request for Clarification requesting the trial court 
to clarify its decision. [R. 550]. 
9. In response to the Personal Representative's Motion, 
the Honorable Guy R. Burningham entered a Final Judgment on 
February 9, 1995. [R. 590]. 
10. Paragraph 6 of that Final Judgment recognizes the 
validity of the trust but indicates that the Trust 
was a revokable trust and contained language to the 
effect that the surviving trustee shall continue as 
sole trustee succeeding to all the powers, duties and 
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discretionary authority to the trustees jointly. 
Therefore, upon the demise of Hazel L. West ( one of 
the co-trustees) the surviving trustee (Herschel Joseph 
West) had full authority over the trust property and 
exercised that authority when he Quit Claimed it to 
himself and his wife, Marilyn West, as joint tenants. 
By making the above transfer, Herschel Joseph West 
affectively revoked the valid trust, leaving the 
residence in joint tenancy with himself and Mrs. West 
and upon his death, Mrs. West became the sole-owner of 
the residence by operation of law. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. Herschel and Hazel West intended to and, in fact, 
created a valid joint trust as co-trustors for the benefit of 
their three children. 
II. The only method by which a joint trust may be revoked 
during the life of co-trustors is by the joint decision of both 
co-trustors. A joint trust then become irrevocable after the 
death of one of the co-trustors. 
III. Herschel J. West, Sr. did not meet the requirements of 
a valid termination of a joint trust under Utah law. The only 
method by which the joint trust may be terminated after the death 
of one of the co-trustors is by a consent of all of the 
beneficiaries to the trust. The children of Herschel J. West, 
Sr., and the Appellants herein, never so consented. 
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BRIEF ANSWER 
At the time of their father's death, Appellants became 
owners of the property in question through the trust created for 
them by their parents jointly because, while the trust was 
revocable, Herschel J. West, Sr. could not unilaterally revoke 
the trust. The power to revoke is reserved for the trustor, not 
the sole trustee, which he became upon Hazel's death. 
Appellants' interest in the trust property vested at the time of 
creation of the trust. Even if their interest did not vest at 
creation of the trust, it certainly did vest at the moment of 
their mother's death. Therefore, his attempted revocation 
through transfer of the deed to himself and Appellee was invalid 
and Herschel J. West, Sr. retained only a life interest as sole 
trustee, at most. Furthermore, even if he had the right to 
transfer the property, he never recorded the deed before his 
death and the transfer should fail on that ground. Therefore, 
Appellee has no interest in the trust property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The requisite elements of a valid joint trust existed. 
When determining questions relating to a trust - as with any 
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written document, such as a contract or a statute - the Court 
generally first looks to the document in question. In the case 
at bar, the requisite elements existed to create the trust and it 
was written, signed and recorded. The fact that a valid trust in 
real property was created is not challenged by Appellee. 
However, it is important to examine the terminology and the 
expectations of the trustors to determine whether Herschel J. 
West, Sr. had the legal right to revoke the trust after the death 
of his first wife and co-trustor, Hazel West. 
A., Intent Based on the Language of the Trust 
The trustors did intend to create a trust for their 
children. That is apparent from the trust document. 
The recording of a deed and placing the names of others 
on the property is somewhat in the nature of a public 
declaration that [the grantor] intended the instrument 
to become effective immediately. People as a rule do 
not deliberately put a flaw in the title to their 
property, thereby handicapping its later disposal, 
unless they really intend to transfer some interest to 
the person whose name is thus placed in the record. 
Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632 (Utah 1984) (citing Allen v. Allen, 
204 P.2d 458 (Utah 1949)). The Wests intended to create this 
trust and became the trustee of the property, holding it for the 
benefit of their children. 
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Furthermore, the plain language of the trust unambiguously 
indicates that it is a joint trust, consequently requiring joint 
revocation. Noble v. Rogan, 49 F.Supp 370, 372 (S.D. Cal. 1943). 
The trust itself uses terms such as "settlors", "ourselves", "our 
lifetime", "disposition by us", and "we as trustee". The use of 
the plural in discussing actions and powers clearly indicates 
that the two trustors intended a joint trust to be created and 
desired consent from both of them for subsequent actions. 
The language of the revocation clause, specifically, makes 
it quite clear that joint consent was intended for revocation of 
the trust. The trust states: 
We reserve unto ourselves the power and right... during 
our lifetime to amend or revoke.... The sale or other 
disposition by us of the whole or any part of the 
property held hereunder shall constitute as to such 
whole or part a revocation of this trust. 
"The revocation clauses spoke entirely in the plural, thereby 
evincing an intent... that revocation could only be accomplished 
mutually." Khan v. Khan, 214 Cal. Rptr. 109, 112 (1985). The 
co-trustors of the West trust similarly spoke in the plural and 
simply did not utilize language indicating a contrary intent, 
although they easily could have. "Had there been a contrary 
intent, the agreement would have provided: xWe reserve unto 
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ourselves or either of us...'" Id. (emphasis added). Absent from 
the language of the trust is any indication of individual rights 
among the co-trustors. No reservation of rights or control is 
left to the survivor either, which could easily have been 
expressed; thus, the intent for joint revocation is apparent. 
Noble v. Rogan,4 9 F. Supp. at 3 70. 
On the contrary, the language of the new deed created by 
Herschel J. West, Sr. for himself and Appellee did include 
language of survivorship. Mr. West was apparently aware of the 
power of this language if he included it in his second deed. To 
his misfortune however, he did not include language of 
survivorship in the joint trust. Therefore, even as the 
survivor, he had no individual power to revoke after the death of 
his co-trustor. 
Hazel West's intent must also be considered. The 
circumstances surrounding the trust indicate that Hazel West 
intended her children to receive the family property. According 
to Bogert, "where a provision is ambiguous or uncertain in its 
meaning, resort may be had to extrinsic evidence to determine the 
terms of the trust". Bogert, Trusts and Trustees,S 164.1. Bogert 
suggests that the circumstances that may be considered include 
the situation of the trustor, the beneficiaries and the trustees; 
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their relations to each other; and the purposes for which the 
trust is created. Id. When considering that it would be 
extremely rare for a mother to approve a revocation taking 
property from her natural children and giving it to her husband's 
new wife, the Court may easily determine Hazel's intent as to the 
trust beneficiaries. In upholding Culver v. Title Guaranty & 
Trust Co.. 70 N.E.2d 163 (N.Y. 1946), the court stated that the 
deceased settlor may have departed this life secure in 
her belief that she had so arranged her affairs that 
her daughter would be benefitted....We think it fairer 
and more in consonance with legislative intent not to 
deprive her by reason of her death, of her right to 
refuse to consent to partial or total revocation. 
Id. at 165. Hazel died assuming that her children would receive 
her interest in the family home. Her wishes should be carried 
out and the home should be offered to Appellants to meet the 
intentions of the trustors at the time the trust was created. 
B. Purpose of the Trust 
The Wests created this trust comprised of their family home 
for the benefit of their children. One clause of the trust 
includes language that specifies that if the trustors die, the 
successor trustee has the authority to expend trust money for the 
"maintenance, education, and support of the beneficiary" if they 
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are under 21 years old; otherwise the money was to be distributed 
to the beneficiaries and terminated. It is clear that the 
trustors created the trust for the purpose of providing for their 
children's "maintenance, education, and support" in the future. 
C. Type of Trust Created 
Appellants contend that an inter vivos trust was created. 
"An inter vivos trust is created when a settlor, with the intent 
to create a trust for, or declares that he or she (the settlor) 
holds specific property in trust for, a named beneficiary." 
Sundquist v. Sundquist. 639 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1981) (citing 
Restatement of Trusts 2d, §§ 2, 17). In Sundquist, divorcing 
parents had created a trust for their children, which was to be 
held for them, but not actually given to them until years later. 
Similarly, the Wests intended to create a trust for their 
children and hold it for their later use. According to the 
holding in Sundquist, this was an inter vivos joint trust which 
could not be terminated by only one of the parents. 
Granted, the right of revocation would have allowed the 
Wests to terminate their trust if they so chose, but that option 
was never utilized by the trustors in "their lifetime." Until 
the power of revocation is actually exercised, the trustors have 
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essentially promised to give away their ownership interest and 
act as trustees. "[A] trust inter vivos does not fail because a 
settlor declares that he holds the property in trust, with power 
to revoke and to receive the income during his life." In Re 
Tunnell's Estate. 190 A. 906, 909 (Pa. 1937). 
D. When the Beneficiaries' Interests Vested 
The children, as beneficiaries, probably gained an ownership 
interest in the property at the time the trust was created, but 
certainly gained an ownership interest when their mother died, 
thereby precluding their father's revocation. While Appellants 
contend that an inter vivos trust was created, their interest 
would have vested at the time of their mother's death even if it 
was a testamentary trust. In either case, their interest had 
vested before the alleged revocation took place, thereby 
precluding it. 
When Herschel J. West, Sr. and Hazel West created the trust 
in question in 1986, they, as trustors, no longer retained their 
original ownership interest. They had passed some interest on to 
their children and became the trustee of the property. 
Possession was not required for the beneficiaries' trust interest 
to vest. Because the children's property interests had already 
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vested, the court below could not alter those rights. 
In Sundquist, 63 9 P.2d 181, the Utah Supreme Court decided 
that even with the continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes relating to a divorce decree, u[t]hat power does not 
authorize the court to alter property rights already vested in 
other parties, such as in the children who are the beneficiaries 
of the trust..." Because there was trust property in existence 
at the time, the Court held that the beneficiaries' interests had 
already vested, precluding the alteration of the trust interests. 
Their trust was to be held until some years later, perhaps not 
being transferred to the beneficiaries until after the trustors' 
deaths. Likewise, although the West trust might not have been 
transferred until the deaths of both trustors, it included real 
property and was, in fact, in existence at its inception, causing 
an immediate property right to be vested in the beneficiaries. 
This has previously been held to preclude the alteration of a 
trust and should similarly preclude the changes allowed in the 
West trust. 
II. Herschel J. West# Sr. never had the power to revoke the 
joint trust unilaterally. 
16 
A. The Various Powers of Herschel J. West, Sr. 
Herschel J. West, Sr. - as co-trustor, sole trustee, 
survivor, or executor - never possessed the power to unilaterally 
revoke the joint trust. 
1. Trustor 
Herschel J. West, Sr. was not an individual trustor; he was 
a co-trustor. Therefore, in order to revoke or amend the trust 
at any time, he needed the consent of Hazel, the other co-
trustor. He, therefore, did not have the power to unilaterally 
revoke the trust through his position as trustor. In Hill v. 
Conover. 191 Cal. App. 2d 171 (1961), a husband argued that he 
was sole trustor after his wife's death and was therefore 
entitled to revoke the trust himself. However, the court found 
no merit in this contention and denied his attempted revocation, 
insisting that consent from both co-trustors was necessary. Id. 
2. Trustee 
Neither did his position of trustee allow him to 
unilaterally revoke the trust. In the judgment below the court 
held that the trust "contained language to the effect that the 
surviving trustee shall continue as sole trustee succeeding to 
all the powers, duties and discretionary authority given to the 
trustees jointly," and therefore considered the unilateral 
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revocation valid. This decision cannot be supported, however. 
As earlier noted, Herschel J. West, Sr. and Hazel West had named 
themselves "the trustee", singularly. Again, her consent was 
required. Furthermore, the power to revoke is reserved for the 
trustor, not the trustee. Referring to similar revocation 
language in a joint trust, a California court determined that the 
right to revoke belonged to the trustors as trustors, not as 
trustees. Khan v. Khan, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 109. The West trust 
document states that in the case of the death of one co-trustor, 
the other would become the "sole trustee". This position, did 
not confer any greater powers to Herschel upon Hazel's death. 
The purpose of a trustee is to hold trust property for the 
benefit of others and the trustee's duties are fiduciary in 
nature, preventing him or her from wasting or disposing of the 
trust, especially for his own use. 
A trustee is in a fiduciary relation to the 
beneficiaries of the trust....In some relations the 
fiduciary relation is more intense than is others; it 
is peculiarly intense in the case of a trust. It is 
the duty of a trustee to administer the trust solely in 
the interest of the beneficiaries. He is not permitted 
to place himself in a position where it would be for 
his own benefit to violate his duty to the 
beneficiaries. 
Scott on Trusts § 170 (1983). 
Scott also cites the Uniform Trusts Act, § 5, as stating 
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" [n]o trustee shall directly or indirectly buy or sell any 
property for the trust from or to itself or an affiliate;...or 
from or to a relative, employer, partner, or other business 
associate". Id. Additionally, Scott states, "it is now, of 
course, well settled in the United States as well as in England 
that a sale by a trustee to himself individually can be set aside 
if it was made without the consent of the beneficiaries." Id. 
See also Schug v. Michael, 245 N.W.2d 587 (Minnesota 1976) 
(quoting Restatement of Trusts § 170); Matter of De Planche, 318 
N.Y.S.2d 194 (1971); In re Kline. 59 A.2d 14 (N.J. 1948). 
Similar language has been enacted in Utah: 
Any sale or encumbrance to the trustee, the trustee's 
spouse, agent, attorney, or any corporation or trust in 
which the trustee has a substantial beneficial interest 
or any transaction, which if affected by a substantial 
conflict of interest on the part of the trustee, is 
voidable by any interested person, except one who has 
consented after fair disclosure, unless (a) the trust 
expressly authorized the transaction; or (b) the 
transaction is approved by the court after notice to 
interested persons. 
U.C.A. 75-7-404. Rights of survivorship were not expressly 
authorized in the West trust, nor was the transaction 
transferring the property to Herschel J. West, Sr. and Appellee 
approved by the court upon notice to Appellants. 
This section was cited by the Utah Supreme Court, which 
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stated, "absent authorization from a court with jurisdiction over 
the administration of the trust or consent of the beneficiaries, 
any transaction involving self-dealing by a trustee is not only 
prima facie invalid, but is voidable by the beneficiaries, 
regardless of any loss suffered by the trust estate, the payment 
of valuable consideration, or the existence of good faith." 
Wheeler v. Mann. 763 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1988). 
3. Survivor 
As a survivor Herschel J. West, Sr. might have had greater 
power had the trust document so stated. But, if the trustors 
intended to offer the survivor individual power or control, they 
failed to include such language in the trust. "Where a power to 
revoke or amend is given by the settlors to be executed by mutual 
consent, the power is not exercisable by the survivor of them." 
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 1001. 
4. Executor 
Even as the executor of Hazel's estate, Herschel did not 
gain her revocation power. In Re Chemical Corn Exchange Bank, 
169 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1957), held that a husband and co-trustor of an 
inter vivos trust could not revoke the trust after the death of 
his wife, even though he was the executor of her estate. 
Revocation required "mutual consent" during her life and that did 
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not change upon her death. Id. The situation is exactly the 
same in the case at bar. Therefore, Herschel could not forego 
Hazel's consent by offering it on her behalf as her executor. 
The executor cannot adopt a co-trustor's revocation right. 
B. Revocation Requirements When Hazel West was Alive 
When there are several trustors, all co-trustors must 
consent to the revocation of a joint trust. It is well 
established that a joint trust, if revocable, requires joint 
revocation. Solomon's Trust Estate, 2 A.2d 825 (Pa. 1938); 
Hackley v. Farmer, 234 N.W. 135 (Mich. 1935); Croker v. Croker, 
192 N.Y.S. 666 (1921); Kelley v. Snow, 70 N.E. 89 (Mass.); Downs 
v. Security Trust, 194 S.W. 1041 (Ky.); Richardson v. Stephenson, 
213 N.W. 673 (Wis.). If this were not so, no joint trust would 
be secure. 
C. The Effect of Hazel West's Death 
Well established treatise principles and the laws of other 
states firmly set forth the rule that a joint trust becomes 
irrevocable at the death of any co-trustor. Khan v. Khan, 214 
Cal. Rptr. 109; In Re Chemical Corn Exchange Bank, 169 N.Y.S.2d 
600; Culver v. Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 58 N.Y.S.2d 116 
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(1945)(upheld, 70 N.E. 2d 163 (1946)); Noble v. Rogan, 49 F. 
Supp. 370/ Solomon's Trust Estate, 2 A.2d 825/ Croker v. Croker, 
192 N.Y.S. 666. This principle follows the logic that joint 
consent is necessary for a valid revocation, and because a dead 
co-trustor no longer has the ability to consent to revocation, 
the joint trust becomes irrevocable. 
Referring to a joint trust created for the trustors' 
children, Noble v. Rogan ruled that amending a joint trust, even 
if to better benefit the children, simply cannot be done by one 
co-trustor after the death of the other. uJoint powers, not 
coupled with an interest, do not survive.... It should not be in 
the power of either party after the death of the other to destroy 
the trust both created and both intended to subsist." Noble v. 
Rogan, 49 F. Supp. at 372 (citing Croker v. Croker, 192 N.Y.S. 
666). Another California case is on point. In Kahn v. Kahn, 214 
Cal. Rptr. 109, the issue presented was whether a co-trustor of a 
revocable joint trust could unilaterally revoke the trust. The 
Court held that one trustor could not unilaterally revoke the 
trust without the consent of the other trustor. That case is 
especially important in that the trust reviewed contained 
language very similar to the West trust. 
Several New York cases also stand for the proposition that 
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one trustor may not revoke the trust after the death of a co-
trustor. In Croker v. Croker, 192 N.Y.S. 666, the court would 
not allow a husband to revoke a trust after the death of his 
wife, when they were both trustors and the language of the trust 
evidenced an intent that the right of revocation should be 
exercised jointly. Similarly, in Culver v. Title Guaranty & 
Trust Co., 58 N.Y.S.2d 116, the court held that a trust 
established by multiple trustors could only be revoked by the 
joint consent of all the trustors. Because the consent of each 
would be required if all were living, the fact that one was dead 
did not confer upon the others the power to destroy the trust 
which was intended by the deceased to remain. In upholding this 
case, the Court of Appeals of New York in Culver v. Title 
Guaranty & Trust Co., 70 N.E. 2d 163 stated: 
were all of the joint settlors living the consent of 
each to a revocation either in whole or in part, would 
be necessary. There appears to be equal reason for 
forbidding whole or partial revocation when one of them 
is dead or may not be heard. 
Id. At 165. 
In In Re Chemical Corn Exchange Bank, 169 N.Y.S.2d 600, a 
husband attempted to revoke a trust where he was a joint trustor 
with his wife. The court held that where the husband and wife, 
as joint trustors, provided in an inter vivos trust agreement 
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that they could not revoke or modify its terms except by written 
mutual consent, the husband had no power to do so after the death 
of his wife. Furthermore, the court held that a trustor's power 
to revoke a trust is personal to that trustor; it terminates upon 
his or her death and cannot be exercised by any one else. 
Finally, in Solomon's Trust Estate, 2 A.2d 825, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania held that a trust created by two trustors 
was such that it could only be revoked jointly. The Court stated 
succinctly: 
It should not be in the power of either party after the 
death of the other to destroy the trust both created 
and both intended to subsist. If we held as appellant 
suggests that the power survived to the mother, it 
could be exercised to deprive the other children of 
their income. No trust jointly created would be secure 
under such a determination. 
Id. at 826. 
Accordingly, it is apparent from the case law provided that 
a surviving trustor may not revoke a trust after the death of 
another trustor. The language in the West trust certainly 
evidences the intent that the trust could only be revoked by 
joint action of both trustors. Under the circumstances of this 
case, the Court should consider the clear principle set forth by 
other states which would require it to find that Herschel J. 
West, Sr. failed in his attempt to revoke the joint trust simply 
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because the trust became irrevocable at the death of the other 
co-trustor. 
III. Herschel J. West, Sr. did not meet the requirements of 
a valid termination of a joint trust under Utah law. 
While the actions of Herschel J. West, Sr. appear to have 
been an attempt at unilateral revocation of a joint trust, there 
is no Utah case law directly on point. However, the Utah Supreme 
Court has addressed the issue of termination of a joint trust. 
In Clayton v. Behle, 565 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1977), the Supreme Court 
specifically established requirements for the unilateral 
termination of a joint trust. Generally, termination of a trust 
is accomplished by the beneficiaries or some third party. 
However, termination has been attempted by a joint trustor. 
Under the Clayton rule, termination can be accomplished "where: 
(1) all beneficiaries consent, (2) no beneficiary is under an 
incapacity, and (3) the continuance of the trust is not necessary 
to carry out a material purpose of the trust." Sundquist v. 
Sundquist. 639 P.2d 181 (citing Clayton). 
Sundquist relied upon Clayton to determine there was no 
valid termination of a joint trust under circumstances similar to 
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those in the case at bar. A parent, and co-trustor, was 
attempting, during divorce proceedings, to terminate a trust 
created for their children. It might be claimed that Herschel J. 
West, Sr. attempted to terminate, rather than revoke, the trust. 
However, this argument would also fail because he did not gain 
consent from the co-trustor, or in her absence, all the 
beneficiaries; nor did he prove that the purpose of the trust had 
been met and the trust was no longer required. 
First, all co-trustors must consent or if one will not 
consent, his or her consent may be substituted with the 
affirmative consent of all the beneficiaries. Sundquist. 639 
P.2d at 187 (emphasis added). Obviously, Hazel West could not 
consent upon her death. Therefore, Herschel J. West, Sr. should 
have received the affirmative consent of all three beneficiaries, 
which he failed to do. Secondly, the party attempting to 
terminate must prove that there is "no unfulfilled purpose of the 
trust which could be carried out by its continuance." Id. 
Because the purpose of the trust was to provide for their 
children and retain the home within the family, Herschel J. West, 
Sr. could not prove that this purpose had already been carried 
out and there was no further reason to maintain the trust. 
However, he never made an effort to show either of these 
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requirements. Consequently, his failure to meet these 
requirements nullifies his attempted termination of the trust. 
Additionally, while the second deed created after Herschel 
J. West, Sr. attempted to terminate the trust might otherwise 
have been valid, the trust was still in effect and takes priority 
over the second transfer of property. "[A]part from statute, 
transfers of the legal title to land rank, between themselves, 
according to priority in time." Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 
3 96, 3 99 (Utah 1983). Furthermore, Herschel J. West, Sr. never 
recorded the second deed, but Appellee caused it to be recorded 
after his death. That indicates that the property was never 
actually delivered and could, by itself, nullify the transfer. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the transfer of this trust property was 
invalid because Herschel J. West, Sr. never had the power to 
unilaterally revoke or terminate the joint trust he created with 
his first wife, Hazel West. The Court can reach this conclusion 
by considering the intent of the trustors, the plain language of 
the trust, the time at which the beneficiaries gained an interest 
in the property, the requirements that treatises and other states 
have set forth for revocation of a joint trust, or the 
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requirements established in Utah for termination of a joint 
trust. 
Because the revocation was invalid, the court below erred in 
awarding the family home as part of the Personal Representative's 
property because it actually belongs to the West children by 
virtue of this trust. 
Having expounded on the applicable rules of law, Appellants 
pray this Court to forthwith return to them their rightful 
property, with all of its fixtures and appurtenances. Appellants 
further pray this Court to remand to the trial court an 
evidentiary hearing for the purpose of establishing an award to 
Appellants for the equivalent of reasonable rental monies since 
the date of their father's death against the Personal 
Representative. 
DATED this 5th day of October, 1995. 
< / $ & -
Jeffrey A. Orr 
Attorney for Petioners and Appellants 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed two (2) copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant on this 5th day of October, 1995 
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by first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Gregory B. Hadley 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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ISLS 
Ui-lOJ.J 
Jieclarattnn of tErust 
WHEREAS, WF H e r s c h e l J . West and R^^^l T.. w ^ t -
 0f the CxiyftMr/ 
of P r o v o County of Utflh State of Utah 
arc the owners as joint tenants of certain real property located at (and known as) fi 5 4 E 37^0 N. 
in the CityfFow/of P r o v o State of U t a h 
which property is described more fully in the Deed conveying it from N e l l i f t Marif? S m i t h 
to H e r s c h e l J . West & H a z e l L. West as "that certain piece or parcel of land with buildings thereon 
standing, located in said P r o v o
 t being 
All of lot 1, Block 2, plat "A", Valli Hi Subdivision, Provo, Utah 
according to the official plat thereof on file in the office of the 
Recorder, Utah County, Utah. Subject to deed restrictions and easements. 
Subject to a Declaration of Protective Covenants and Restrictions recorded 
in Book 937, page 312, as Entry No 5997 in the office of Utah County 
recorder. • 
Subject to a trust Deed executed July 10, 1963 by LeGrande G. Smith and 
Nellie Marie Smith to Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company, recorded 
July 11, 1963 as Entry No 9290, in book 943, Page 385 of official 
Records. To secure $15,500.00 of which the Grantees agree to assume and 
pay according to the conditions and terms therein. 
Being the same premises earlier conveyed to the Settlors by an instrument dated 18 J u l y 1 9 6 9 and 
recorded in Vol. . 6 9 2 , Page 3 1 8 of the P r o v o Land Records. 
NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that we do hereby acknowledge and declare that we 
hold and will hold said real property and all our right, title and interest in and to said property and all furniture, fixtures and 
personal property situated therein on the date of the death of the survivor of us9 IN TRUST 
1. For the use and benefit of the following (3) T h r e e persons, in equal shares, Wifcaaxbaxiifet^^ 
stirpes: 
1. Herschel J. West Jr) Our Son 
2. Richard Lee West Our Son 
3. Carole Ann West Edmunds Our Dauthter 
If because of the physical or mental incapacity of both of us certified in writing by a physician, the Successor Trustee 
hereinafter named shall assume active administration of this trust during our lifetime, such Successor Trustee shall be fully 
authorized to pay to us or disburse on our behalf such sums from income or principal as appear necessary or desirable for our 
comfort or welfare. Upon the death of the survivor of us, unless the beneficiaries shall predecease us or unless we all shall die as 
a result of a common accident or disaster, our Successor Trustee is hereby directed forthwith to transfer said property and all 
right, title and interest in and to said property unto the beneficiaries absolutely and thereby terminate this trust; provided, 
however, that if any beneficiary hereunder shall not have attained the age of 21 years, the Successor Trustee shall hold such' 
beneficiary's share of the trust assets in continuing trust until such beneficiary shall have attained the age of 21 years. During 
such period of continuing trust the Successor Trustee, in his absolute discretion, may retain the specific trust property herein 
described if he believes it in the best interest of the beneficiary so to do, or he may sell or otherwise dispose of such specific trust 
property, investing and reinvesting the proceeds as he may deem appropriate. If the specific trust property shall be productive of 
irectlv for the maintenance, educatioi .d Nupport ot the benehciary without the interaction ot anv guardian and without 
application to anv court. Such payments ot income or principal mav be made to the parents ot such nenencian or to the person 
with v*hom the beneficiarv is living without anv liability upon the Successor Trustee to see to the application thereof. If such 
benehciarv survives us but dies betore attaining the ace of 21 vears. at his or her death the Successor Trustee shall transfer, pav 
over and deliver the trust property being held for such beneficiary to such benehciary s personal representative, absolutely. 
2. Each benehciary hereunder shall be liable tor his proportionate share of any taxes levied upon the total taxable estate of 
the survivor of us by reason of the death of such survivor. 
3. All interests of a beneficiarv hereunder shall be inalienable and free from anticipation, assignment, attachment, pledge or 
control bv creditors or by a present or former spouse of such beneficiarv in any proceedings at law or in equity 
4. We reserve unto ourselves the power and right dunng our lifetime (I) to place a mortgage or other hen upon the property, 
(2) to collect any rental or other income which may accrue from the trust property and to pay such income to ourselves as 
individuals. We shall be exclusively entitled to all income accruing from the trust property dunng our lifetime, and no 
beneficiary named herein shall have any claim upon any such income and/or profits distributed to us. 
5. We reserve unto ourselves the power and right at any time dunng our lifetime to amend or revoke in whole or in part the 
trust hereby created without the necessity of obtaining the consent of any beneficiary and without giving notice to any 
beneficiary. The sale or other disposition by us of the whole or any part of the property held hereunder shall constitute as to such 
whole or part a revocation of this trust. 
6. The death dunng our lifetime, or in a common accident or disaster with us. of all of the beneficianes designated hereunder 
shall revoke such designation, and in the former event, we reserve the right to designate a new beneficiary. Should we for any 
reason fail to designate such new beneficiary, this trust shall terminate upon the death of the survivor of us and the trust property 
shall revert to the estate of such survivor. 
7. In the event of the physical or mental incapacity or death of one of us. the survivor shall continue as sole Trustee. In the 
event of the physical or mental incapacity or death of the survivor, or if we both shall die in a common accident, we hereby 
nominate and appoint as Successor Trustee hereunder the beneficiary named first above, unless such beneficiary shall not have 
attained the age of 21 years or is otherwise legally incapacitated, in which event we hereby nominate and appoint as such 
Successor Trustee the beneficiary named second above, unless such beneficiary named second above shall not have attained the 
age of 21 years or is otherwise legally incapacitated, m which event we hereby nominate and appoint 
(Name) r ^ r n l g Ann W e s t Edmunds 
(Address). Box 3441 Clearwater 
of 
F l o r i d s 33515 
Number Street City State Zip 
to be Successor Trustee. 
8. This Declaration of Trust shall extend to and be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of the 
undersigned and upon the Successors to the Trustees. 
9. We as Trustee and our Successor Trustee shall serve without bond. 
10. This Declaration of Trust shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State 
of. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and seals this 
day of 
(First Settlor sign here) . 
(Second Settlor sign here) 
I, the undersigned legal spouse of one of the above Settlors, hereby waive all community property, dower or curtesy rights 
which I may have in the hereinabove-described property and give my assent to the provisions of the trust and to the 
inclusion in it of the said property. 
L.S. 
Witness: (1) _J 
STATE OF 
COUNTY OF. 
On the v *p day of. \A*4<^9 
Witness: (2) 
City 
or 
Town 
r? personally appeared 
and. 
known to me to be the individuals who executed the foregoing instrument, and ac] 
deed, before me. 
(Notary Seal) 
d the same to be their freyact and 
—/ Notary Public 
-f? ctnrjnVW 

A F F I D A V I T 
ENT 3 1 9 9 5 BK 2 5 5 1 P 6 5 1 0 
STATE OF UTAH 1 MIMA B REID UTAH CO RECOROER BY AT 
STATE OF UTAH )
 QCT ^ 3.35 prf ^g g # 0 0 
8
 • » • RECORDED FOR HERSCHEL J WEST 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Herschel J West* t>*sing f i r s t duly sworn upon oath, desposes and says: 
That he Is a c i t izen of the United States of America and i s over the age of 
2J years; 
Hint he knows of his own knowledge that Hazel L. West 
who appears in the certif ied copy of Ueath Certificate attached hereto. Is one 
nnd the sume person as Hazel L West who appears as one of the Grantees and 
joint tenants In that certain Warranty Deed dated j u i y 18,1969™* recorded 
as Entry No. 43230*" ^0 0^1692< l t P*R*318 *n t' , e office of the 
Recorder, Utah County, Utal?. 
Further affiant saith not. 
UESCRIPTION: 
A l l of l o t , Block 2, P l a t "A", V a l l i Hi S u b d i v i s i o n . Provo. Utah, 
a c c o r d i n g t t o the o f f i c i a l p l a t t h e r e o f on f i l e i n the o f f i c e of t h e 
c ity r e c o r d e r . 
Subscribed and swarn to before me, a Notary Public, this ' O - ^ O - J J o 
My Commission Expires: KYCCrc:.:::" ^""I 

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
HERSCHEL JOSEPH WEST, 
Deceased. 
CASE NO. 91-3400471 
RULING 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 on Personal Representative 
Marilyn West's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court has reviewed the file, 
weighed oral arguments, considered the memoranda of counsel, and upon being advised in 
the premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. Pursuant to Sundquist v. Sundquist. 639 P.2d 181 (Utah 1981); Makoff v. 
Makoff. 528 P.2d 797 (Utah 1982); Larson v. Overland Thrift & Loan. 818 P.2d 1316 (Utah 
App. 1991); George T. Bogert, Trust § 11 (6th ed. 1987) and numerous other Utah cases, 
Personal Representative's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to the 
following trusts: Trusts ## 3, 4, 8, 9 [EXHIBITS D, E, I, J of Personal Representative's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment] 
are invalid. 
2. Trust #3 is invalid because there is no cash account that exists with this 
number #414 15595; Trust #4 is invalid because the signature page is not the proper 
corresponding signature page; Trust #8 in invalid because there was no attached Schedule A; 
and Trust #9 is invalid because it does not have an attached Quit Claim Deed. Therefore, 
the property or corpus of any of these four trusts must revert to Herschel West's estate in 
order to determine the percentage of Marilyn West's elective share. 
3. Personal Representative's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED 
as to the following trusts: Trusts ## 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 ,10 ,11 [EXHIBITS B, C, F, G, H, and 
EXHIBIT L of Herschel West Jr.'s Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment] are valid. Trust #11 is also valid under a Constructive trust theory 
analysis, but this theory only applies to this trust since Marilyn is currently possessing the 
property purported to be within this trust. Trust #2 only encompasses the surface rights and 
1.25% of the mineral rights, and the remaining 98.75% mineral rights shall revert to 
Herschel West's estate. 
// 
Counsel for Personal Representative Marilyn West is to prepare an order consistent 
with the terms of this ruling and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior 
to submission to the Court for signature. 
Dated this ^ d a y of October, 1994. 
cc: Gregory B. Hadley, Esq. 
Jeffrey A. Orr, Esq. 
BY THE COURT: 
CHAM, ]W2>6] 
Ruling Page -2-
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URY PARK PLAZA 
GREGORY B. HADLEY (3652) 
Counsel for Personal Representative 
2696 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 377-4403 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF HERSHCEL JOSEPH WEST, 
Deceased. 
REQUEST FOR 
CLARIFICATION OF RULING 
AND ENLARGEMENT 
Probate No. 91-3400471 
Judge Burningham 
COMES NOW .the .Personal Representative and does hereby 
request the Court to clarify its1 Ruling of October 25, 1994, 
and would therefore set forth the following: 
1. The Personal Representative is unsure of the purpose of 
the Courts- language pertaining to "Marilyn West's elective 
share" as set forth on the top of page 2 of the ruling as the 
Personal Representative has not made the election. 
2. The language of paragraph 3 of the ruling pertaining to 
trust 11 (Exhibit L to Objector's Memorandum) is confusing as 
the Personal Representative does not know to whom the Court has 
awarded her residence. Although the Court has ruled that this 
trust is valid, the Personal Representative has contended that 
Mr. West validly transferred the property from the trust 1) 
which he had the express authority to so do, 2) retaining 
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counsel and drafting a revocation and transfer statement 
(Exhibit 0 to Objector's Memorandum) and 3) signing and causing 
to be recorded a Quit Claim Deed (Exhibit P to Objector's 
Memorandum) conveying the property from the trust to himself and 
his widow as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship. 
Further, the gratuitous constructive trust language is confusing 
as it appears it could be argued on behalf of either the 
Personal Representative or the Objectors. 
3. Lastly, the Court did not address in its' Ruling the 
status of items 2 through 6 of Schedule C of the Inventory which 
is attached _as JLEExhibit A" to the Personal Representatives 
Memorandum. 
WHEREFORE, the Personal Representative would ask the Court 
to clarify its ruling as set forth above and to enlarge the 
periods set forth in Rule 4-504 CJA until such time as so 
clarified. , 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <<L day of A / O U 
1994. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a copy of the 
foregoing on this jQ^ // day of /7W<^ r>? f*-c/r > / 1994, by first-
class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
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Jeffrey A. Orr, Esq. 
HILL, HARRISON, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
3319 North University Avenue, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Secretary 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
HERSCHEL JOSEPH WEST, 
Deceased. 
CASE NO. 91-3400471 
RULING 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 on Personal Representative 
Request for Clarification of Ruling and Enlargement; Objector's Motion for Reconsideration 
and Objector's Request for Entry on Land and Inspection, The Court has reviewed the file, 
considered the memoranda of counsel, and upon being advised in the premises, now makes 
the following: 
RULING 
1. Personal Representative Request for Clarification of Ruling and Enlargement is 
GRANTED. Therefore, this court will clarify it's October 25, 1994 Ruling below, 
2. Trust #11 is valid, however, it did contain Joint Tenancy language. 
Therefore, upon the demise of one of the joint tenants, the surviving joint tenant, Herschel 
West, had full authority over the trust property and exercised that authority when he Quit 
Claimed it to himself and then to himself and Marilyn West as joint tenants. By making the 
above transfer he effectively revoked the valid trust, leaving the residence in joint tenancy 
with himself and Marilyn West and upon Herschel's demise, she became sole owner of the 
residence. 
3. Since there are not any trusts, that purport to contain the items listed in 
PFCFiVFR JA:i 1 9 1995 
Schedule C, these five items are property of HerscheTs estate. 
4. Pursuant to this Court's October 25, 1994 Ruling and in light of the 
discrepancies with the signature page and Quit Claim Deed, as offered by the children of the 
Deceased, Objector's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 
5. Pursuant to Ruling #1 above, Objector's Request for Entry on Land and 
Inspection is DENIED. 
Counsel for Personal Representative Marilyn West is to prepare an order consistent 
with the terms of this ruling and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior 
to submission to the Court for signature. All outstanding contrary issues that were not 
specifically dealt with, but which are related to the above Court's Ruling, are hereby MOOT. 
Dated this Z / d a y of January, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Gregory B. Hadley, Esq. 
Jeffrey A. Orr, Esq. 
Ruling Page-2-
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GREGORY B. HADLEY (3652) 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
2696 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801)377-4403 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
HERSCHEL JOSEPH WEST, 
Deceased 
FINAL JUDGEMENT 
Probate No. 91-3400471 
Judge Burningham 
Pursuant to the Personal Representatives Motion for Partial Summary Judgement 
challenging the validity of 10 different trusts, her Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings 
challenging the validity of an additional trust and Objector »s Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgement, this court heard oral argument on September 23,1994. After 
considering the various memorandum of counsel and having determined that there was 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving parties were entitled to 
judgement as a matter of law, the court entered a ruling on October 25,1994. On 
November 2,1994, the Personal Representative filed a Request for Clarification of 
Ruling and Enlargement and subsequent thereto the Objectors filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration and a Request for Entry on Land and Inspection. The court, having 
reviewed all memorandum pertaining to said Requests and Motion, entered its ruling on 
January 17,1995. 
NOW THEREFORE THE COURT, expressly determining that there in no just 
reason for delay and directing the entry of final judgement in this matter and for good 
1 
cause appearing, does hereby ORDER, AJUDGE, AND DECREE as follows: 
2 [ 
„ 1. The Personal Representatives Request for Clarification of Ruling and 
4II Enlargement is granted. 
5 2. The Personal Representative Motion for Partial Summary Judgement is 
6
 (I granted and Objector fs Motion for Partial Summary Judgement is denied as to trusts 
7„ 
numbered 3, 4, 8, and 9 as trust #3 is invalid because there is no cash account that exists 
8" 
with the number #414 15595; trust #4 is invalid because there is no signature page and 
9 " M 
„ the one that is attached is not the proper signature page; trust #8 is invalid because 
H1| there is no Schedule A identifying the trust property, and trust #9 is invalid as there is 
12 no Quit Claim Deed or other conveying instrument indicating said trust was ever funded 
1 3 1 | 3. All of the cash and contracts set forth in Schedule C of the inventory filed by 
the Personal Representative are property of Herschel Joseph West fs Estate as there are 
no trusts that purport to contain these items. 
4. The Objector !s Motion for Partial Summary Judgement is granted and the 
131| Personal Representative's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement is denied as to trusts 
19 numbered 1, 2,5, 6, 7, and 10 as these trusts are valid on there face. However, trust #2 
2 0 1 | only encompasses the surface rights and 1.75% of the mineral rights with the remaining 
21 „ 
98.25% mineral rights reverting to and becoming a part of Herschel Joseph West's 
Estate. 
5. Therefore as to Schedule A of the Inventory filed by the Personal 
251| Representative items #1, as qualified under paragraph 4 above, through #13 are 
261| contained within valid trusts and therefore are not part of Herschel Joseph West !s 
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Estate. Items 1 through 6 as set forth in Schedule C of the Inventory and 98.25% of the 
oil, gas, and mineral rights in the following described property situated in Bighorn 
County, State of Wyoming are contained within and part of the Herschel Joseph West's 
Estate as being administered by Marilyn West, the Personal Representative to wit: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
(NWV4SEV4) of section twenty three (23) Township 56 (56) 
North, Range 97 (97) West of the 6th. Principal meridian, 
Wyoming, containing 40 (40) acres more or less. 
6. The Personal Representative 's Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings is 
granted. Although trust #11 is valid it was a revokable trust and contained language to 
the effect that the surviving trustee shall continue as sole trustee succeeding to all the 
powers, duties, and discretionary authority given to the trustees jointly. Therefore, upon 
the demise of Hazel L. West (one of the co-trustees) the surviving trustee (Herschel 
Joseph West) had full authority over the trust property and exercised that authority when 
he Quit Claimed it to himself and his wife, Marilyn West, as joint tenants. By making 
the above transfer, Herschel Joseph West effectively revoked the valid trust, leaving the 
residence in joint tenancy with himself and Mrs. West and upon his death, Mrs. West 
became the sole-owner of the residd by operation of law. Therefore, that certain 
Notice of Lis Pendens recorded in the offices of Utah County Recorder on November 3, 
1993, as entry number 79096 in book 3288 pages 331-2 is hereby released as it pertains 
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to the following described residential property located in Utah County, State of Utah to 
wit: 
All of lot 1, Block 2, plat "A", Valli Hi 
Subdivision, Provo, Utah according to the 
official plat thereof on file in the office of the 
Recorder, Utah County, Utah. Subject to deed 
restrictions and easements. 
7. The Objector's Motion for Reconsideration and their Request for Entry on 
Land and Inspection is denied. 
8. All outstanding contrary issues that were not specifically dealt with, but which 
are related to this Final Judgement, are hereby moot. 
DATED this day of , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
Approved as to form: 
Jeffery A. Orr, Counsel for Objectors 
Herschel J. West Jr., Richard L. West 
and Carole A. West Edmunds. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY thaU personally mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing on this 7S day of AHMJUU^A^ , 1995, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed to the following: * 
HILL, HARRISON, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
Jeffery A. Orr 
3319 North university Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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NOBLE et al. v. ROGAN, Collector of 
Internal Revenue. 
No. 1413. 
District Court, S. D. California, 
Central Division. 
March 24, 1943. 
1. Trusts <S=>2 
A trust of movables created by an 
instrument inter vivos is administered by 
trustee according to law of state where 
instrument creating trust locates admin-
istration thereof. 
2. Trusts <3=52 
Where declaration of trust fixed ad-
ministration thereof in Pennsylvania, 
Pennsylvania laws governed. 
3. Trusts <3=»59(l) 
Where settlor reserves a power to 
revoke trust only in a particular manner or 
under particular circumstances, trust can 
be revoked only in such manner or under 
such circumstances. 
4. Internal revenue <§=>I044 
Where-husband'and ntffe treated fftfft 
ittr a child and reserved right tff revocation* 
use of the word "settlors" tof designate* 
husband and wife without a reservation to* 
ftirvivor of any right of control indicated 
tflat any subsequent amendment must be 
*tiy joint action of both and trust became* 
irrevocable on jieath of husband, so that^ 
declaration in subsequent writing by wife 
ihat trust was imvocable wa9 without^ 
4egal effect and declaration that she waived 
a*hy right to dispose of the trust principal -
Iff will under power of appointment was 
IfRle more than a mere ministerial act from 
which no taxable "gift" resulted. Revenue 
Act 1932, § 501, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Acts, 
page 580. 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
"Gift" and "Settlor". 
Action by Purdon Smith Hall against 
Nat Rogan, Collector of Internal Revenue 
for the Sixth District of California, to 
recover gift taxes alleged to be illegally 
and erroneously assessed and collected. 
During the pendency of the action, plaintiff 
died and Adaline Jane Noble and others, 
plaintiffs executors, were substituted as 
plaintiffs. 
Judgment for plaintiffs. 
Claude I. Parker, Ralph W. Smith, Raj-
Kohlmeicr, and Harriet Geary, all of 
Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs. 
Leo V. Silverstein, U. S. Atty., £ t* 
Mitchell, Asst. U. S. Atty., and Armoml U 
Jewell, Asst. U. S. Atty., all of Los Angel 
Cal., for defendant. 
J. F. T. O'CONNOR, District Judge. 
This is an action to recover gift ta* 
in the amount of $3,S 19.69 averred to 
illegally and erroneously assessed 
collected. 
This action was commenced by Purdot 
Smith Hall, who died during its pendency 
and on motion duly made, Adaline Jam 
Noble, Emily Purdon von Rombcn 
Spreckels, and Bank of America National 
Trust and Savings Association, executor o* 
the estate of Purdon Smith Hall, decease 
were substituted as plaintiffs. 
On April 25, 1928, Purdon Smith 
and her husband, William H. Hall, 
settlors, and Purdon Smith Hall 
William H. Hall and York Trust Compa-
a corporation organized under the laws 
the State of Pennsylvania, as trust' 
executed and entered into a trust agr~ 
ment, the material portions of which p 
vide: "That the Settlors have transfe 
to the Trustees one thousand (1,000) sha 
of the Four Dollar Cumulative Parti" 
pating Preferred Capital Stock of Sou' 
eastern Power and Light Company, * 
trust, nevertheless, to hold the same 
the proceeds thereof if sold and with po* 
to sell with unanimous consent of 
Trustees, and to pay the income thereof 
Emily Purdon von Romberg, daughter 
the Settlors, during the term of her nate 
life, free from anticipations, alienatii 
or assignments or transfers by operaA 
of law or otherwise, and upon her death 
dispose of the principal thereof in the 
manner as her interest in the resp 
estates of the Settlors shall be disposed 
by their last wills and testaments, one-^  
of the trust fund to be disposed of 
the will of each Settlor so that the int 
of the said Emily under such will and 
agreement shall be equalized with anjr 
terest given to her sister, Jane, by -
will * * *. It is the purpose of-, 
Settlors that this trust agreement sir 
superseded by a more formal and de 
agreement and nothing herein cont* 
shall be held or construed to prevent 
Settlors from embodying in such t^ 
trust agreement such provisions as 
NOBLE v. ROGAN 371 
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beneficiaries and 1932, 26 U.S.CA. Int.Rev.Acts, page 580 
-ocation, management, 
Ilher matters as they shall determine, but provided: "(a) For the calendar year 1932 
nle>s and until this agreement is super-
ILjed. it shall be and remain in full force 
and effect." 
caid Emily Purdon von Romberg 
Cprcckels was born on the 31st day of 
lanrirv. 1908, and is now living. On 
March' 19, 1930 said William H. Hall died 
without any change being made in the 
aforementioned trust agreement. On 
\in*ust 16, 1935, in the State of California, 
Purdon Smith Hall executed a certain 
document wherein she declared, inter alia: 
«* * * that said trust shall be and is 
hereby made Irrevocable, and the same 
shall hereafter be administered under the 
terms of said original agreement as modi-
fied by the terms of this declaration 
* * *. I hereby waive and release any 
right I might otherwise have to dispose 
of any or all of the principal of said trust 
by my last will and testament." In the 
gift tax return filed by Purdon Smith Hall 
for the year 1935, was included as part of 
the sum of $415,253 disclosed on said 
return as the total value of gifts made by 
Purdon Smith Hall in said year, the amount 
of $31,000 as a gift occurring by reason of 
the execution of the document dated 
August 16, 1935. Of the said $31,000 the 
sum of $21,890.34 represented the life es-
tate of said Emily Purdon von Romberg 
Spreckels and the remainder of said $31,-
, 000, to wit the sum of $9,109.66, represents 
the remainder interest. On or before 
March 15, 1936, Purdon Smith Hall caused 
to be filed with the defendant, Purdon 
Smith Hall's duly executed donor's federal 
tax return for the calendar year 1935. On 
"March 7, 1939, Purdon Smith Hall filed 
her written claim for refund of the federal 
Pit tax purpoitedly overpaid by her in 
the amount of $3,819.69 with interest as 
* provided by law. The latter sum repre-
sents the gift tax on $31,000 for the year 
1935. Thereafter Purdon Smith Hall's 
claim for refund was rejected and she 
received notice of rejection of said claim 
0,1
 April 7, 1939. 
The question for determination is: 
. [1-3] Where two individuals execute a 
declaration of trust, reserving the right of 
J^ocation, and are designated therein as 
and each calendar year thereafter a tax, 
computed as provided in section 502, shall 
be imposed upon the transfer during such 
calendar year by any individual, resident or 
nonresident, of property by gift. 
"(b) The tax shall apply whether the 
transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the 
gift is direct or indirect, and whether the 
property is real or personal, tangible or in-
tangible; but, in the case of a nonresident 
not a citizen of the United States, shall ap-
ply to a transfer only if the property is situ-
ated within the United States." 
[4] If the right to amend or act with 
reference to the trust or any portion there-
of survived in the survivor, then the 
government's contention that a taxable gift 
was consummated by executing the in-
strument of August 16, 1935, must be sus-
tained. "A trust of movables created by an 
instrument inter vivos is administered by 
the trustee according to the law of the 
state where the instrument creating the 
trust locates the administration of the 
trust." Rest, of the Law, Conflict of Laws, 
sections 297, 299, pp. 397, 381; Hughes v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 9 Cir., 
104 F.2d 144; Helvering v. Stuart, Novem-
ber 16, 1942, 317 U.S. 154, 63 S.Ct. 140, 
87 L.Ed. . Here, the administration 
of the trust was in Pennsylvania, therefore 
its laws should govern. The only Pennsyl-
vania case cited is In re Solomon's Trust 
Estate, 1938, 332 Pa. 462, 2 A.2d 825. 826, 
which is adverse to the position of the 
government. There "Appellant's parents 
set up an inter-vivos trust, the income to 
be paid to the settlors' three children for 
life, one-third to each child. It further 
provided: 'The Donors shall have the 
power, at any time during their lifetime, 
by an instrument in writing delivered to 
the Trustee, to modify, alter or amend 
this agreement in whole or in part; 
* * * . '" By letter the donors directed 
the trustee to " 'pay to us the one-third' of 
the net income which had been paid to 
appellant. The trustee complied with this 
direction. Later the father died, and his 
widow thereafter directed the trustee to 
resume payment to appellant. After com-
plying with this direction, the trustee was 
settlors", is the right to act joint, whereby advised it could not legally pay this income 
the c
 trust becomes irrevocable upon the to the son. To an account filed complying 
r*"} °* one of said settlors, or has the therewith, the son filed exceptions which 
rvivor the right to amend or alter the were dismissed." In response to the appel-
^
s t
- Section 501 of the Revenue Act of lant's contention that both parents merely-
372 4*> FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT 
wished to punish the son "temporarily, and 
intended to restore the income to him, but 
had neglected to do so," the court de-
clared: "The letter itself determines the 
legal status of appellant; it is clear and 
unambiguous. The power to revoke is 
specifically referred to, and it is indicated 
clearly that the parents were exercising 
that very power. The words 'until further 
notice' meant, of course, joint notice of 
mother and father. * * * Joint powers, 
,aot~ceuplcd with an interest, do not sur-
v ive . * * * It should not be in the 
power of either party after the death of the 
other to destroy the trust both created and 
both intended to subsist. * * *" Croker 
v. Croker et al., 117 Misc. 558, 192 N.Y.S. 
666, is cited by the Solomon case, supra, 
where the views of the court in the latter 
case are confirmed. State Street Trust Co. 
v. Crocker, 306 Mass. 257, 28 N.E.2d 5, 128 
A.L.R. 1173. Conceding the correctness of 
the government's assertion that the ques-
tion is one of intent, Rest, of the Law, 
Trusts, section 4d, yet the provisions of the 
trust manifesting the Settlors' intention do 
not support the defendant's claim. It is 
clear that Purdon Smith Hall and her 
husband intended to create a trust requiring 
the joint action of both in any subsequent 
amendment or revocation. This is apparent 
from the use of the word "Settlors", and 
the ultimate disposition sought without re-
serving to the survivor any right of con-
trol, which might easily have been ex-
pressed. "If the settlor reserves a power 
to revoke the trust only in a particular 
manner or under particular circumstances, 
he can revoke the trust only in that manner 
or under those circumstances." Rest, of 
the Law, Tr. section 330 j . The instrument 
executed by Purdon Smith Hall declaring 
the trust irrevocable, was of no legal effect. 
While a power of appointment existed, to 
be exercised by Purdon Smith Hall after 
the death of her husband, William Hall, 
the exactness in which the appointees were 
designated and the mode in which dis-
tribution was to be accomplished left little 
more than a ministerial act to be per-
formed. The instrument executed on 
August 16, 1935 was merely an affirmation 
of the disposition intended by the settlors 
in the original declaration of trust. It did 
not create or transfer any right to or in-
terest in the corpus of the trust nor affect 
the status of the parties which had been 
theretofore established by operation of law. 
The court finds that there was no gift as 
contemplated by section 501 of the Revenue 
Act of 1932 and the tax was illegally 
assessed. The instrument executed by 
Purdon Smith Hall dated August 16, 1935 
was void and of no effect, as Purdon Smith 
Hall had no power to change the terms of 
the trust agreement dated April 25, 1928. 
Plaintiffs will recover the amount of the 
tax illegally paid to the government 
In re ULRICH. 
In re SAUBER. 
Nos. 1828, 1950. 
District Court, D. North Dakota. 
March 1, 1943. 
1. Bankruptcy <S=»4 
Since Bankruptcy Act provision re-
lating to redemption by farmer-debtors is 
not clear, courts must construe Congres-
sional intent so that it can be administered 
with practicality and fairness to bank-
rupts and creditors. Bankr.Act § 75, sub. 
s, 11 U.S.C.A. § 203, sub. s.
 ? 
2. Bankruptcy <S»38 1 
An original appraisal of farmer-^ 
debtor's property does not become "final" 
and binding on all parties for purposes of 
redemption after expiration of four 
months, and hence creditors may have a 
reappraisal after farmer-debtor declares 
intention to redeem notwithstanding credi-
tors' failure to object to original appraisal 
within four month period, as against con-* 
tention that after expiration of four 
months either party may show only an 
appreciation or depreciation in value be-
tween time of original appraisal and time, 
of reappraisal. Bankr.Act § 75, sub. s(3),. 
11 U.S.C.A. § 203, sub. s(3). 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of , 
"Final Appraisal". ^ 
In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Fra 
J. Ulrich and William J. Sauber, bank; 
rupts, wherein the bankrupts petition" 
for right to redeem at appraised value and* 
creditors objected and requested a rear 
praisal and the Commissioner held tha 
IN RE ULRICH 
49 F.Supp. 373 
373 
(he parties were bound by the value fixed 
at time of the original appraisal to which 
holding the creditors objected. 
Orders of Commissioners set aside and 
cases remanded to the Commissioners 
with instructions. 
F. E. McCurdy, of Bismarck, N. D., for 
bankrupt. 
A. L. Quilling, of St. Paul, Minn., for 
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul. 
VOGEL, District Judge. 
The question before the court in these 
cases is whether or not an original ap-
praisal under Subsection s of Section 75 
of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 203, 
sub. s, becomes final and binding on all 
parties for the purposes of redemption 
after the expiration of four months, with 
the exception only of either party being 
able to show upon reappraisal that there 
had been an appreciation or depreciation 
in value between the time of the original 
appraisal and the time of the reappraisal. 
Subsection s provides: " * * * Such 
fanner may, at the same time, or at the 
time of the first hearing, petition the court 
that all of his property, wherever located, 
whether pledged, encumbered, or unen-
cumbered, be appraised, and that his unen-
cumbered exemptions, and unencumbered 
interest or equity in his exemptions, as pre-
scribed by State law, be set aside to him, 
and that he be allowed to retain posses-
sion, under the supervision and control of 
the court, of any part or parcel or all of 
the remainder of his property, including 
his encumbered exemptions, under terms 
and conditions set forth in this section. 
Upon such a request being made, the ref-
eree, under the jurisdiction of the court, 
shall designate and appoint appraisers, as 
provided for in this title. Such appraisers 
shall appraise all of the property of the 
debtor, wherever located, at its then fair 
and reasonable market value. The ap-
praisals shall be made in all other respects 
with rights of objections, exceptions, and 
appeals, in accordance with this title: 
Provided, That in proceedings under this 
section, either party may file objections, 
exceptions, and to take appeals within four 
months from the date that the referee ap-
proves the appraisal." 
Paragraph (3) of Subsection s provides 
for reappraisal as follow*: "At the end 
praisal of the property of which he re-
tains possession, including the amount of 
encumbrances on his exemptions, up to the 
amount of the appraisal, less the amount 
paid on principal: Provided, That upon 
request of any secured or unsecured credi-
tor, or upon request of the debtor, the 
court shall cause a reappraisal of the 
debtor's property, or in its discretion set a 
date for hearing, and after such hearing, 
fix the value of the property, in accordance 
with the evidence submitted, and the debtor 
shall then pay the value so arrived at into 
court, less payments made on the principal, 
for distribution * * *." (Italics for 
emphasis.) 
The question raised will affect a large 
number of cases now pending before con-
ciliation commissioners and before this 
court. The facts in the Ulrich case will 
serve as an example. In the Ulrich case 
the original appraisal was had on March 
2, 1942. The amount of the appraisal was 
$960. The creditors made no objections, 
took no exceptions or appeals therefrom, 
and more than four months expired before 
the debtor made his petition to redeem. 
The debtor then petitioned for the right to 
redeem the real property at the appraised 
value, $960. Upon receiving notice there-
of the creditors objected and requested a 
reappraisal or hearing on value in ac-
cordance with paragraph (3) of Subsection 
s, quoted above. Hearing on such petition 
was had on October 26 and 27, 1942, at 
which time the creditors and bankrupt 
presented evidence with reference to val-
ue, such hearing being before the Com-
missioner. The Commissioner found from 
such evidence that there had been no 
change in the value of the property be-
tween the date of the original appraisal 
and the date of the hearing on value, and 
held that all parties were bound by the 
value fixed at the time of the appraisal, he 
taking the position that the parties were 
limited in the hearing on value to a show-
ing of appreciation or depreciation in 
value subsequent to appraisal, and that 
they could not attack the original appraisal 
as being improper after more than four 
months had expired subsequent to such ap-
praisal. The Commissioner filed his 
memorandum opinion upon which he based 
his action. He adopted the theory that the 
reappraisal or hearing on value provided 
for in the law was only for the purpose of 
three years, or prior thereto, the debtor showing an increase or decrease in values, 
m ay pay into court the amount of the ap- not for the purpose of disturbing the ac-
•H" 
53RD CASE of Level 1 printed in i? UJLI±J Luimau 
Estate of FRANK M. KHAN, Deceased. MARIGOLD E. KHAN, 
Petitioner and Appellant, v. CLIFTON KHAN, as Co-executor, 
etc., et al., Objectors and Respondents 
Civ. No. B003654 
Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, 
Division Five 
168 Cal. App. 3d 270; 214 Cal. Rptr. 109 
May 16, 1385 
IIOR HISTORY: 
iperior Court of Los Angeles County, No. WEF18586, Jacqueline L. Weiss, Judge, 
:SPOSITION: The judgment is reversed. 
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le cotrus tof of^a 
appeal prases 
mi l a t e ra l iyH * 
-CTaif 
The issue arises in the following context. Frank M. Khan (Frank) and 
ppellant, Marigold E. Khan, husband and wife, owned two parcels of real 
BC59BRZ3lZB> On July 22, 1981, they mutually executed two separate, but 
ientical, trust agreements, one with respect to each parcel of real estate 
a the same date, by quit claim deeds, they conveyed title to each parce of 
real property to themselves as trustees of the respective trusts. The quit 
laim deeds provided: ' ' W M W B W B a n d ^•••••••nHiiiHHM 
propertyj " (Ilalics added.) 
property and 
n i . c - . • J. , _ 
i i i u i a K u i e , 
f. . JI _ _ x. i- _ r-
L1& U f c J c L L I l U i 
1. .' 1 . 1 . . . „ ,.. A 
i n JLUI e l i . n i 
agreements provided that they would hold the "said real 
all our right, title and interest in and to said property and 
fixtures and personal property situated therein on the date of 
the survivor of us, In Trust" for the benefit of their two 
[*272] The agreement reserved to the trustors the income from 
he trust during their lifetime. The agreeruents contained the following 
evocation clause: "We reserve unto ourselves the power and right at any time 
uring our lifetime to amend or revoke in whole or in part the trust hereby 
reated without the necessity of obtaining the consent of any beneficiary and 
ithout giving notice to any beneficiaiy. The sale or other disposition by us 
f the whole or any part of the property held hereunder shall constitute as t< 
ch whole or part a revocation of this trust. " (Italics added.) t 
•otnote 
V I I ML x u 
188 Cal• App. 3d J U 3 , i I U 
n1 It is not contended that conveyance to the trust altered the community 
itus of the property, and, of course, the presumption is that it did not. 
itz v. United States (3th Cir. 1367) 382 F.2d 723.) 
-End Footnutes-
In September 1381, appellant 
81, a restraining order was is 
spos i ng, se11i ng, encumber i ng 
roperty. On Januaiy 25, 1383 
...iin •iti.ii.rm ^ — f f l « « f r " which he 
2 iguiu XL. j\xidii, n us tees, wxie 
oresaid trusts, as to his on 
rust estates and hereby not if 
e-half (1/2) undivided interesi 
roper ty ass a tenant-in-common 
e-half (1/2) undivided interesi 
instituted dissolution proceedings. In November 
sued in the dissolution proceeding prohibiting 
or transferring the parties1 community 
/ * • • » ton 11 III till llllliilll l l l l i l l ^ ^ 
[*+111] addressed to "Frank M. Khan and 
r e i n he dec la red t h a t he revoked "both of the 
e -ha l f (1/2) undivided i n t e r e s t of t he a f o r e s a i d 
i e s the t r u s t e e s . . . t h a t he holds h i s 
t of s a id t r u s t e s t a t e s , as h i s s e p a r a t e 
with Marigold E. Khan, T rus t ee of the o ther 
The notiee-u£rwvo<j«*t i-on was-mm^V^mpfMimft^^ 
^ s o l u t i o n , p roceed ing , Jean Wong {Wong^ j . i^oLeopy of _th£ n< 
rpellant?. f K e r e a f t e r , on January 25, 19SJ^ j^ MrittwMiaaariiaBafeted aTWITl4 i a MiH7SSmT!9 
tft h i s e n t i r e e s t a t e in t r u s t *mh&mt*<i& c'f'il'flH^WPBHJiaWKxrpus to. .be d i s t r i b u t e d 
I them when t h e youngaa&j^aasi^^ 
^ a l o f^ the d . i sso iu t j 
Eprigr,_to * 
Xi^ 
Frank's will was filed for probate. Appellant petitioned to set aside the 
state to herself as surviving spouse pursuant to Probate Code section 640. 
- was stipulated that if the revocation was ineffective, the estate was minimal 
id would be subje^^^t^^theprovisions of Piobate Code section 640. n3 
ian, offered to* Ce§WPfl*W^ weeks afCKE 
ant her the not ice nj£"Tw/OUallunar and that she acknowledged r«gcgjj 
tid that everything was finv. Counsel for appellant objectec^BBB^ 
antimony, and the testimony was not taken. Counse^BlHBBHBBI^t^^t^of fered "*tXTl" 
B K appellant testify that she never fc&aaismcL any rfBaBftBWaBttBBEXit^ ntion t^r^v<*k« 
BHBoLAVer consented to itj. The com t never made a formal ruling, but it stated 
iat no claim c^ts beiny made that the notice had ever been sent to appellant, 
nereby implying that appellant's testimony would be unnecessary. She did not 
est i fy. 
-Fuutnotes-
n2 At the time of Frank's death, Probate Code section 640 provided: "If th* 
ecedent leaves a surviving spouse or minor child or minor children, and the 
et value of the whole estate, over and above all liens and encumbrances at the 
ate of death and over and above the value of any homestead interest set aparl 
ut of decedent's estate under Section 660 or Section 661 of this code, does noJ 
xceed the sum of twenty thousand dollars ($ 20,000), the same may be set aside 
o the surviving spouse, if there be one, and if theie be none, then to the 
inor child or minor children of the decedent*" 
n3 Respondent asserts in its brief to this court that the only other 
property in the estate is an automobile worth considerably less than $ 20,000 
End Footnotes-
> « 4 V « i T M Ir* fwr*® v ii—m IMfQ'SSH 
npp, 3d 27u, T Z / O , Z« I <i O C L J. 
After taking the matter under submission, the trial court denied the Probate 
le section 640 petition. A motion for reconsideration was also denied and 
s appeal followed. 
mmm 
eral ly*. mm I r e s s l y made ITrSvodal 
tmtim&y t r u s t s h a l l be 
Wcmn a v o l u n t a i 
EdWdes it* 
m 
W'^SS^mssrmient c r e a t i n g — 
4revocable by t h e t r u s t o r W B i 
LS revoked by t h e trtrati: 
t o t h e t r u s t esdt&tiyr" In a d d i t i o n , 
v i l Code s e c t i o n 2268 p r o v i d e s : " W i r e t h e r e . a r e seve^B^BSSi^MHMBBBBRBEidr 
MBMBHMB t^ prop&sBB&Sfc uniwKK&mmm1mmmBanB6 
f n4 
•r oo L no te s -
n4 f K S ^ ^ F j e c t declaSSffl^BPSSPi 
iild^^act a l o n e , e^^ept upon ^deat 1 ncapac 11 y of~ t l ie o that* 
-End Footnotes -
In K i i i v . Conover 
id w i f e j o i n t l y c r e a t 
"ter t h e husband's d 
isbcind had e f f e c t e d a 
lat s i n c e the t r u s t 
Sting a l o n e , wi thout 
j r ther h e l d t h a t s i n e 
Siting a l o n e c o u l d not 
A n A 
I / I (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 
ed a trust consisting of 
[12 Cal.Rptr >22] , a husband 
ommunity real property. 
testamentary revocation of the trust. '•KKkdourt helH 
the wife's consent, could not revoke igt. •••Tcourtf 
e the husband and wife were joint trusteesT^trhe husbajj^f 
, in his capacity as»tvu&t&&t~**J^v&z^^Ju£3m&^ 
cat i,0& • Kill v. Couover, supra, is cited in Soger t, 
•n L .. / o -i _ - i \ _ _ _ 4_ .• o r> r> ______ n o r * _c _ _ 4. „ _ x _ A 
H U i j - w e a \ «-.u e u . i e v . j s e u i i u n r J r , p a y e z o o , t u u t n u L e i , ^^112] Tiubtb and jr the proposition that under California law (Civ. Code, | 2280) 
?*&«)% ~f lUH m m *xaa. no 
eSponcient S l e i idiiCy on r leiauiiicLn v . nieCimictn ^ • ^ ^ ' ) i*±o udi .Hpp.^u Hi 
r- A rt i 
J 4 0 J i s e'nt i r e l y in isplaced as the husband in Fleishman acted unilaterally 
n creating the trust 
'out nut es-
n5 Respondent argues that Kill v. Conover, supra, 131 Cal.App.2d 171, 
ctually only stands for the proposition that unilateral revocation is 
neffectual absent notice to the cosettlor. Respondexit reads the decision too 
.arrowly. To the extent that respondent would impose such a limitation on it, 
he language respondent relies on is, at most, dictum. 
-End Footnotes-
r + n n ^ i MultipTemsettIors~^ 
rfCFdes of revoaat ixm^ -thaxi^  those provided far by operation of 1^. The onl 
evidence befuie the trial court as to the intent of the parties to the subject 
trust agreements, however, was the revocat ion clauses themselves and the quit 
*.i*xk&ft.tjL consistent..wi/th .California law;" that fi 
"** - » • • <a V 
.•-<- XB*-®-5«3-™ i r x / i c ® _ k k I C \ / I C ® ^ f f l 
! DO App. 3d 270, *274; 214 uai. npux. 
a contrary intent 
?e provided:. "Mil reservaBBrtHBffi?lar3elve:S QJLJ^^her of u$ • 
tning cannot be read into Uieriranguage actUal iy ""empiofScH 
Enforced by the quoted language^ in- + he quit claim deeds 
Tmake,any demands on the property "as individuals*" 
Respondent argues that the trial court upheld the revocation on a theory of 
tification and estoppel. This argument does not find support in the record, 
e trial court declined to give a statement of reasons for its decision, 
spite the urging of counsel for both parties that such a statement was 
sential in the light of other pending litigation between the parties, no To 
e extent that the basis of the trial court's ruling is discernible, it clearly 
s something other than a theory of ratification or estoppel. The motion was 
ied on stipulated facts and the operative documents. Counsel for appellant 
jected to proffered testimony as to what Wong had told counsel for respondent 
out the notice of revocation. The objection was well-taken as the testimony 
>uld have been hearsay. The evidence was that Wong represented appellant in 
ie dissolution action. There was no evidence that she represented her in 
>pellantfs capacity as a trustee. The court dismissed as unnecessary the offer 
> have appellant testify. The record does not sustain the conclusion that the 
i^al court found ratification or estoppel, nor would the record have supported 
ich a finding. 
-Footnotes-
no Since trial of the matter lasted less than a full day, and no request for 
decision was made prior to the submission of the cause, the court 
as not obliged to give a statement of reasons. (Code Civ. Proc., C ^ *"» > 
ooz, . j 
-End Footnotes-
At the time he executed the notice of revocation, Frank and appellant were 
ngaged in dissolution litigation. The notice of revocation represented an 
ttempt by him to transmute community property into separate property in 
iolation of an existing restraining order. Given the existence of that order 
he pendancy of the dissolution litigation, the legal ineffectuality of the 
nilateral effort to revoke, and the fact that the record title to the real 
ould not act as an estoppel to enable Frank to do that whiclx the law renaered 
Liiii power leas 
L ' ^  >^> J The judgment is reversed. 
•xxir^® K rr-v/ic®*«s 
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s u x i i u r e c e i v e p'c i no ipal tiust, though by 
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designated any 
. , her daughter,, 
On May 19, 1945, a document purporting to revoke the trust was addressed to 
trustee, T4- — - * — -•* v— ^ — — = r.,, •? „.-,.- .,,.-1 ------ * ^,,i„A,, v.*-v. It was signed by nei'x r y - . uu i v e r and I r in a A • Cu 1 v e r , K a t h e r 1 n e 
v e x 
i :*" y r> 
i t r u s t . 
C . _ _ "I 
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I ' '"I i O I 
latter, Louise C. 
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Upon t h e w r i t t e n c o n s e n t of a l l t h e p e r s o n s b e n e f i c i a l l y i n t e r e s t e d in a 
jtst 1 x"i p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y or any paA t t h e r e o f h e i e t o f o r t * or h e r e a f t e r c i e a t e d , 
e c r e a t o r of such t r u s t rnay r e v o k e t h e same a s t o t h e whole or such p a r t 
^ reof , arid t h e / eapon t h e c s l d t n of t h e t r u s t e e s h a l l c e a s e in t h e whole ox" 
-h oar t t h e r e o f »" 
^ l e n , OT*iginellY/'arr a t t i g ^ ^ t r u s t in 
i ^ ' f t p p e l l a t e D i v i s i o n p r o p e r l y d i r e c t e d judgment f o r t h e def*#lf& 
t i e Guar . & T r u s t C o . , 2G9 ftpp. D i v . G27^ and p o i n t e d o u t inr~tte 
i n i o n , c i t i n g c a s e s , t h a t , were t h e r e no a p p l i c a b l e « t * f u + « s *n<\ h«d a 
• r e v o c a t i o n been r e s e r v e d t o th#=» io in t^*HTr>r f l{ 6f t l i e t^rustJ ™>» i 
fe c a s e h e r e - ^11 wouM K^% r e q u i r e d t o j o i n in t h e r e v o c a t i o n a n d ' 
&th o c c u r r e d a&*$B&*&r*<* t ^ W f e v i v o r < $ would be u n a b l e ;tO^ efX^OR it* 
• ft > A W T M 
•% xir^® w I f ^ X / I f ®^ SSSSI1 
&km&mm&M&*mrm*I ru 1 e -•h^sH3eerr*si!^^ 
^CHM Lrir»^i&w^ is sought by the surviving » W H H ^ HySPt?" a"i'lrr uM?* 
ft^fnt settlors living, th»*jcuwks«ut of each .to-a* rts vocation arthex -i-rr^ whoi*^  
HEilWKfc would be necessary•""TtX^re app^€F^*X6^b«^eqti^i r«asq^iijor furbiuUintg> 
* ui"^  partial revocation when one of them is dead and m»y u^iff^nedra. /The/ 
*sed settlor may have departed this life secure in her belief that she had; 
i'i dinged her affairs that her daughter would be benefitted, if alive, by the/ 
kyi of a principal sum contributed not only by her but by othex* settlors 
*,if her daughter were not alive her grandchi ldren would receive such* 
fit. W*=« tb^ r*k it fairer and poro in cons^nanr'e ^ith legislative iiut»uw utgi 
eprive her by reason of her death, of hwr right to refuse [*78] tXM 
pnt.to partial or total revocations 7f the Legislature desires to provider 
^t^i^a^^^^fff^Y-d° s o DY explicit enactment. ~ke two property statutes to 
h we have made reference use the word "creatorf , 7v General CoiisixuuLiunf 
. section 35 "words in the singular .numberrftncincicke the plural . and in the r 
•a I m'imber include the singular." &?e read the word "creator" In the statutes 
meaning all of the settlors who make an agreement such as the .one presenter* ^  
nj Tkus «tli must join to effect partial pr cu^ai„mvouctiiui|| 
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Court of Appeals of California, Secund Appellate District/ 
Division One 
i j i ^ a A • rtpp. z u i / i , z, o a ^ . n p t i . ~z,z, 
H p / i i l O i U U i 
>IL^<U ILXM i n j . » i : u n i . n r e i i n u a x U i a r v t ^ e c i i i aC , w a s u e i u e u iviay u , I J O » , a x i u 
ill ant's Petition for a near i no* by tlie Supreme Court "was Denied June G, 19G* 
judgment of the Supex'ior Court of Los Angeles County. Joseph M. 
Action to have a trust agreement declared invalid, to have it declared to 
e been revoked, to quiet title to pxopex ty referred to in tiust agi eeniexxt, 
to rescind and cancel sucn agieement. 
n A n r m T / M i ' . •* JT C * . . 1 -r. Jl . . . X. -T _ T f . 1 X. . C JC I _ -1 
r u c > * i i u L v . H - u . L i m e u . u u a g i u e x x t . u i u e i e u u d U L d i i i i m e u . 
NSEL *. A r t h u r D. Guy and C h a r l e s F . Legeman i o r A .ppe l l an t . 
B a l l , Hunt S Kar t and C l a r k Keggeness fo r Respondexxt. 
i j r ^ • W o o u , r • J . r o u i L , u . , d i i u i j i i i i e , o . , c u a u u x x e u . 
r^  JLOLM . j. ' < *- j i ' T j ^ j j r ; d i i a i 1 1 S U L e n L a j u u u a i e i i L IV i ; unci L a t x u^s L 
deiiifejut n i a d e b y M. 0 . C u i x o v e r a n d h i s > ? i f e , d e f e n d a n t N a o m i C u x x o v e r , w a s 
. _ 1 * Jl / r\ \ x. 1 . _ X. X. 1 _ X. _ , . . _ X. - . . , _ . - - _ - . X. 1 . - .1 1_ _ _ . . _ 1 _ - Jl 1 . _ _ * » . . / - i _ _ . / O > X. 1 . _ X. 
a x i u , \ z, } cxiriL L n e C I U J S L d y i e t t m e i i t i xau j e e a m v u K e u o y ivix . L u n o w e i , i J J L n a u 
J t ' iitst ou /eemeut wds of no foxce and e f f e c t fo r t he r e a s o n t h a t i t was 
l u c e u ijy Lxxfci L i d U d a u u u x i u O e n u x u y u c e u i u e i e n u a u L , a n u i 4 j L u d i . p i d i m i i ^ s 
. 1 e t o t h e 1 1 u s t a g r e e m e n t ^ x o p e x t y b e q u i e t e d . 
Judg'iuent was in favor of 
r * A n *> i T->"» .• . x ' J? JT . i c _ t i .' . JT u . . I . x. Jt - . _ x. i. _ - , 
>. ' < i o * r x d i u u i i d p p t t d i s i ; uiu u i e ^ u u ^ a i e a i a ixu u o u m a a a , c t m u a y U L I I W I 
. n c s , t h a t c e r t a i n fix ' idincs a r e no t s u p p c t t e c by t h e e v i c e n u e . 
On J u l y 14, "^41 , M. 0 , Coxxove/ and rTajiui T i v ol inge i e n t e r e d i n t o a px enup t la.'. 
' eement which s t a t e d t h a t Mr. Conover t h e r e b y conveyed t o Naomi a market 
1.1 d ing xu Twin F a l l s , I d a h o , a c o c k t a i l b a r in Long Beach, C a l i f o r n i a (known 
Lixe u x y s i d i xr>ax ; , a oaxxK a c c o u i x u u i a p p x o x i ma c e l y *p ^ C J U U , a 0 4 u n - u i c i v 
- u . i t u i J i . e , d i i L a p u n u y o . « * j . e x n a a i d n L y _xx Lxxe amouxxL u x •£ i , o u u . i x i e 
/eeiuent p ' rov ided fu r t hex t h a t in t h e e v e n t Naomi d i d no t marry Mr. Conover , 
3 ag reement would be of no f02ce and e f f e c t ; t h a t t h e conveyance was 
jnd i t iOixed upon t h e a g r e e m e n t " uf Naom 1 t o pay t o Mr. Coxxover' s d a u g h t e r 
^ / i d a j j d x x u (auvM v 1 v i axx n x x x j , cxxe i i u n u x »p o , u u u i n I O U X e u u a i axxxxua^ 
after the death of Mr. Conover; that Mr. 
'A ^ A W T M *% xt^^® w ll-^/l^fc^ffiSSJl 
ver•, during his lifetime, should have control of, and the income from, all 
property, except that Naomi should have control of the cocktail bar ana tne 
t to dispose of the bar and the revenue therefrom. The property reierrea to 
he agreement was all the property which Mr. Conover owned, or in which he 
an interest, except a half interest in a ranch in Idaho. On the same cay, 
A A A n A A <* »_, r*t , „ _. . . X. .. Jl _ JT - . 1 „ -1. .. 1 1. _ ... _ JT X. 1. - --,'- - X 
'**, ! 3*4 i , wi . uuauvei «xeuuieu a u^ciu ^aei euy ne con veyeu. Liifef iiidliiyi 
uiug in lUdiiu tu iNauml. m a t utj^u w<aS U U L recurueu. un uuiy i /, i 3** \ , 
e days after the execution of the trust agreement, they were married in Las 
s, Nevada. At that time he was 70 years of age and she was 44 years of age. 
ad two daughters by a previous marriage — The1ma Greenhall and Vivian Lair a 
Vivian Hill). Naomi had a son by a previous marriage. 
ne LX'yaidi ea.r xiau uetexx puruiidScJU jjy wr . uunuv'ei- in way i J<i i . MuCuru.ing I U 
testimony of Vivian Kill (plaintiff), the purchase price of the bar was .> 
0; she lent Mr. Conover $ 3,500 for use in purchasing tne oar, ne repaid tne 
L about a year later. According to the testimony of Naomi, she and Mr. 
>ver borrowed about $ 5,000 from her sister fox"- use in purchasing the bar. 
ifter the marriage, and prior to April 1945, Mr, Conover and Naomi purchased 
• parcels of real property. Title to those parcels was taken in the name of 
rii as her separate property. According to Naomi's testimony, the first 
jel (awe1 ling house) was purchased oy paying $ 500 of her own money as a dowxi 
ueiiL aau x->y using incume Llutu Lxie i T- i IHJ uxysLcii car . iae ssecuau paxcex 
filing house) was purchased with the proceeds from the sale of the first 
2el and with money from a joint account. The third parcel (apartment house) 
acquired by an exchange of the second parcel. The othei^  parcel (service 
tion) was purchased with money from a joint account. The money in the joint 
juat was income from the Crystal Bar and "income from Twin Falls." 
rtjjuuL hprii :u, \?HU, tne mcLiive-L DuiiUiiiu in ludiiu wciis sulu iui' »> i/;juu, aau 
proceeds from the sale were deposited in Mr. Conoverfs bank account in 
ho. On April 10, 1945, Mr. Conover gave Naomi a check (on that bank account) 
$ 1,000, On April 11, 1945, Mr. Conover, as purchaser, and Irwin Stevens, 
seller, signed escrow instructions regarding the purchase and sale of 
perty in Long Beach, hereinafter referred to as the Apple Valley property, 
purchase price of the property was $ 35,000, which was payable as follows: $ 
A A A X 1. _- _ , -.1. 11. . . -. . . . .1 X 1, - 1. „ T _. _ 1 . .. _ X. - C _ ., fh A A A A A ... ... _ _ JI 1 
uuu LUXUUUXI Lilt? esuxuw, anu m y uaiaxiue ijy a auie LUX 4> iU,uuu seuureu uy a 
st deed on the property. The escrow instructions provided that title to the 
perty [--524] was to be vested in Mr. Conover as his separate property. 
April 13, Mr. Conover and Naomi signed an amendment to those instructions, 
ch amendment provided that title to the property was to be vested in Mr. 
over, "a married man." On April 19, Mr. Conover gave the bank, as escrow 
uex , CL cjiitjcjis. ^ un Lxxe jjduh. accuuni, i xi xuaxxu,/ LUX .p ^CJ,UUU. ni . uuuuvtjx 
X _ JI _ .. _ X _ _' .. X 1. _ _..._. X _ JT A* A A A A A - .- Jl _ _ - _ _ . . . X _ JI _ X _..._. X JI _ _ JI _ .. X 1. _ 
fUUL«u CL nuLfej i n Lix« ainuaxxL UL »> » u , u u u euiu e x t i c u i e u a u u ^ i uet=?u u n t n e 
>perty t o s e c u r e t h e n o t e . The xiote r e p r e s e n t e d t h e b a l a n c e of t h e p u r c h a s e 
c e . (The r e c o r d d o e s no t show whether Naomi a l s o s i g n e d t h e n o t e and t h e 
. _. X JT . _ .1 *T . . ... .' ... X _ X _ .. J ... V 1_ ..--'.. C X "». _ X X T . . J X. JT _ . J! _ . _ ... If - .. X. - JI t 1_ _ X 1. 
Lis L ueeu. i^dUisii states in n&r uriei Lnau ia« L T U S L u«eu wti^ yxycuieu Jjy uuuxi 
ties," apparently meaning Mr. Conover and Naomi.) The Apple Valley property 
LSists of a commercial building and a parning lot. At the time Mr. Conover 
'chased the property it was rented to a firm engaged in the cleaning and 
*ing business. On July 31, 1345, Mr. Conover, as lessor, leased the property 
a term of five years for use as a restaurant, cocktail bar, and parking lot. 
;orciing to Naomi !s testimony, $ 5,000 was paid from the joint account for 
jrovements on the building at that time. 
— ^ rm <*•*<* v l « w m JM*^% ^AEi^TM y f « \ / | ^ ® ^ I I " " X X I ^ " ® -**«PTM 
n April 1 , 194G, Mx". Conover made a will by the terms of which he gave ti'ie 
e Valley property to his daughter Vivian (plaintiff), gave $ 
e" of the Apple Valley property to his daughter The1ma, and gave the 
inder [-175] of his estate "including my [his] interest 
to Naomi. The will included the following statement: "SIXTH; I rurtner 
ai-"-e that the property particularly described herein is my sole and separate 
erty." Ke also stated therein that The1ma "has been provided for by County 
[the ranch] in Twin Falls, Idaho." The Bank of America was named as 
utor of that will, and Julian Van Dyke (who prepared the will) was named as 
>rney for the executor. 
lometime between April 1, 134S (the date of the will referred to above), ana 
imber 12, 1946, Mr. Conover and Naomi purchased property referred to in the 
;fs as the Army and Navy Club. Title to that property was taken in the name 
Jaomi as her separate property. According to Naomi's testimony the property 
purchased with money received from sales of the Crystal Bar and the 
rt merit house referred to above. 
jii December 12, 1946, Mr. Conover made a new will by the terms of which he 
x v _ •* i _ TT . i i , . .. j j . - TT .' . . .• . ... . .. JI JI • . . . - . x _ J» 1. _ ... i. _ . . . . . /* A r\ r\ x _ 
e Liie H p p i e v d i i e y u i u p e r i y i u v i v i a . i i , ctnu u i r e u i e u i i e i LU pciy $ ; u u I U 
I ... _ If _ . . JL _ JT JL 1. _ 1 . . _ If _ J? X 1 . _ X , _ . . J JI V _ _ _ X I . 
uuct ( JUL u i i n e v a i u e u i LHCLL p r u p y n y , CLIIU n e g a v e LU 
i t e t o Naomi. V i v i a n was named a s e x e c u t r i x of t h a t w i l l . Ke 
. . . . * . x 1 . _ x. m l . _ 1 ... _ H 1 - . . _ . 1 . _ _ .' JI _ JI XT 1 r~k j 1 JI r x 1 . _ . . . _ . 1 . 1 • . . r r i - - -' --
r e i l i t i iciL l i ie inid- xici^ u e « i i p r u v i u a u I U I uy i / u u i a y 1 cuiu [ Liie x a n c i i j i n T w i n 
l a , i u a u i o . 
r , X _ ! . . * ^ * »"? V ! - - - - - - "I - - - , - - - JI JL 1 . _ x. * # _ . 
incite i n i 3 ^ / , NcLomi i e t i f a e u LXXOLL ivu 
above, aiid she "ordered" him to leave their residence. 
lived in an apartment for several months. According to Naomi's testimony, 
visited her every day during the time he was living in an apartment. After 
era! months he returned to the residence. The record is not clear as to the 
e he returned. 
Mr. Conover made a new will by the terms of which he 
in the App 1 e Va 11 e.y property to Vivi an, gave 
undivided one-half interest in that property to Naomi, and gave the remainder 
his property to Vivian and Naomi, "share and share alike." Vivian and Naomi 
e named as executrices of that will. The will included the following 
.tement: "I declare that all property of which I die possessed is my separate 
•perty." He also stated therein that he omitted to provide for The1ma for the 
.son he had made gifts of substantial value to her during his lifetime. 
On February 2, 1949, Mr. Conover moved from the family residence to an 
.rtment. According to Naomi's testimony, [* 178] she ordered him to leave 
. _ . , _ . _ i. _ i. _ JI i. _ _ .. J_ _ -r T _ i. _ JI i. _ if JI : „i .. _ x. i_ i. • ._. i n . .. JI r -^4-r ^ r i M _ j_ 
:ciUsse u e uciu u y e a LO I U C I H O CLIIU a e u i u a u i . K e e p n I ss w o r u cuiu i C J ^ ^ J p u t lid. m e 
1 . _ N 
I LIU } 
back on the checking account" (apparently the checking account in 
A 4 C\ A O 1 _ J] _ _ _._ .1 .•_.-' 1 X. _ X 1. _ A C\ A n . . .• I "I r«».. JI _ ., X. 1. _ X _ .,-.. _. -XT 
**, '. r»^ i^ , ne mcicle d oouicii tu uie 1240 w i n , uauer tue uex Hiss ui 
it codicil, he gave to Naomi the income from the Apple Valley property for a 
I O U 01 Linee yecirs dii-ei' ais uydia, CLUU ae uuaiinnyu Liie. ueoemuex IU, 1540, 
.1 as modified by the codicil. 
On May o, »^49, Mr. Conover and Naomi executed a deed conveying the Apple 
[ley property to Mr. Conover and Naomi as trustees. On that same day they 
routed a declaration of trust which provided that they should jointly manage 
•% xi^*® w ff^% Xir^®^2825I!L 
cuxxtxol t h e tx us t p i o p e x t y ; t h a t df te^ t h e dea th of e i t hex t x u s t e e , t l ie 
/ i vux" shuu ld aid.jLid.ye axxd cOxxtxul t h e pxupwx ty ,* tlxctt dux ixxy the l i f e t i m e Ux, Mr. 
jvex t h e t i u ^ t e e b shuu ld uSe t i e income fxum the pxOpexty fox t h e payment uf 
res , cust ,s of ma ixxt exxaxxCe , ax±d paymexxts of px ixicipdl dxxd ixxtex'est uxx ctxiy 
umuxances t h e n , Ox thexea f t ex p l a c e d , a y a i n s t t h e pxupex ty ; t u a t a i t e x t n e 
uexxt uf t h e sterns l a s t xefexxed t o , t h e balaxxCe uf t h e lucerne shuu ld be pailS 
Mx . CouOvex as h i s Sepaxndte pxOpexty. The declaxat ioxx of tx us t p r o v i u e u >l 
thex t h a t upuxx t h e d e a t h of e i t hex t x u s t e e , t h e suxv.v/ixxy t x u s t e e shou ld hA 
t e d with t h e xxyhts of bo th t x u s t e e s and shou ld texmixxate t h e tx us t axxd m 
tx xbute t h e tx u^t e s t a t e as folluWSC Ixi t h e event Mx . Ccxxuve- ^d^ tx±e 
v~ivux he shou ld " e x e c u t e duu de l ivex tu t h e adm i n i s t x a tux Ox executOx C tne 
a t e " uf I'd.'Jiu 1 the pxOmi^oux y nu t e of " ^ d i ^ t i usslae" and Mx . Cuauve. in t n e 
u x"1" uf $ 10,000 payab l e in tax ee equal axxxxual i n s t a l l i«n tb cummexxU iny One 
x d i i e i Lxxe ueaLix Ux. <*aumi. xxie xxute bnuaxu ue secux eu *jy iAie e u n . w L2 USJI 
- A . 1 H X. 1 _ M X. 1 X. _ X. _ _ 1 _ 1 1 _, _ T i . _, JC 1 1 X. 1 X. , _, X. 
a^e , duu cnexeupuu tne u u i i e w bnuuid Cuixvey axxc LxanSIex aix Lne LXUSL 
a t e t u Mx . Cuxxuvex . "Ixx t h e evexxt t h e ^a id ITaumi CuaOvyr s h a l l be t h e 
vivcx t h e s a i d t x u s t e e s h a l l e x e c u t e and de l ivex t o Vivian H i l l , t h e daUyhtex 
s a . l % • . O. Cj. iuver, xf ^diL Vx/xaxx H i l l s h a l l be thexi Suxviv^xxy, axxd if she 
i n x . 1 x.1 , • _ • x . i . x . - r ' O ' T <"«, i l l i r ^ i r* ^  1 _ i i 
x
 h uui ^e Lnexx suxVIVxxxy tnexx t u on 11 xey ui eenxxa xyu anc nexen Gi eex i^xa xyxx 
eenha1 1] , t h e yx axxdchx 1 dx ei* uf s a - d M. C. C^LUvex , t h e px'umissuxy xxute uf the 
d t x u s t e e axxd of t h e Said Naumx Cunuvex ixx t h e t o t a l px i n c i p a l amuiint of * 
r> rs r\ M m i x. 1 i i 1 l i x l x. • x. JL „ x. x. l 
auu, . . . *!*« nc_e baumu xje secux eu oy Lne e i i n i e n u b ^ e^^a^e , ax*c 
'x eupOxx t h e t r u s t e e shou ld cOxxvey and. tx dabfex a l l t h e tx ubt e s t a t e tu NaOmi. 
x . 1 i j i . 1 J? • x . 1 x. x _ x . 1 • x . x . ' ^ i x r * ^ n m 1 x. 
>xx nxe uea ui u i exLxxer LX US LUX, Lxxe t.ui viv xxxy tx us, Lee micxx >- , . / ' j uu ^ 
mid nut be xequixed t o , use any of t he dbbe t s Ox pxuceeds of t h e txUSt e s t a t e 
t h e payiueixt of axxy deb t^ of Such deceased tx ubtux ^hicii t h e £>uxvivlny 
i s t ee miyht e l e c t t o pay . All expenses uf l i t i c a t i u i x axxd at tox 'xiey 's f e e s , 
ux x ed by t h e tx at . teeb ux ex thex uf them ixx culxxxect xuxx with t h e admixxi s t x a t i un 
intex px e t a t ioxi of t h e declaxat ioxx Ox t h e x i y h t s of t h e p a x t i e S uxxdex t h e 
eemexxt, shou ld be a chax ye ayaixx^t t h e txa^>t e s t a t e . 
Ndumx t e s t i f i e d a^ > f o l l u w s : Mx • Cunuvex ^ u c c e s t e d , px iox t u t h e t ime t h a t t he 
x^t ay >. eement wdb made, t h a t she see Mx . Fax x , axx attoixxey xn LUJI> Axxyelejrj. 
i bdw Mx . Fdfx axxd t o l d him t h a t she and Mx . Cunuvex waixted "this* pxOpexty 
xe Apple Val ley p i u p e x t y ] f ixed vvhex e xxeithex One — we w i l l be a b l e tu be 
Lx tu b o t h . " Mi . Fax x px epax ed axx ayxeemexxt anil mai led xt t u them. Mx . 
xc/ex ub_ec ted t c ^ a i d ayxeemexxt fux tne r eds.ua Ina t a pxuvxbxuu txxat he wdb 
i j _ i • .c x i x. i • i • i JT J. • T I T i ! i j * x . _ x . i t _ j r 
.iave i^xe xncune x. x urn Lxxe pxepex LV uux my ix i s> m e u i i i y ndu ueexx i e i t uu L UI 
x. / - s ^ f r- /i r» i n x. i x . x . _ ^ * m f r e * l • i x . i 
i ^y x ee'ieii s. . en siay ^ , i j ^ : , luey ^ex-v. iu i^x . r ax x ^ u«x.xce aixu ^x^aeu Lxxe 
eemexxt af tex i t had been x edx dwxx t o ix^cl jde t h e j x u v i b l u a xeyaxdiuy iixcume. 
x^ ea.f tex , checks fux t h e texxtal uf t h e px upex ty wei « depus>xted by Mx . Conuvei 
t n e _uxi*t jdiii^ accuuxxt . 
-r 1 * T - , I T i i i x. i i • J. • jr jr x. x ' j ^ ' i i i x i x. %* 
uU^ep^ /-* . r a x t , caxxeu db a f i ^nebb uv L j id .n^ i i i iybL**.eu v.naL ne meL ivix. 
xuvex j. n ^040, and he x eixdex ed l e - a l >^ex ^iwei^ fcx lx x
 4u axxd ITaumi a t v a i i u u ^ 
ues aftex t h a t d a t e " w i t h i n a ^eax" aftex t h e txuSt aux eemexxt was execu ted 
^y jex e x ix h i s u f f iCe axxd Mx . Cunuvex desc r Ibed t h e t i u s t ay x eemeixt bxxef ly tu 
i , x . i i x . %# ^ x.x.1 re i , i r * * r or i 
n, auuUL a weeK xa^ex , i¥ix . wuxxuvex came iu Li*e u i ^xce axuixe axxu i ^^uj 
->uyht a cupy uf the txuSt ayl eemexxt /vxth Ixxdi. Def exxdaxxt f s a t t oxney asked Mx . 
11 truest iuixs xeyaxdixiu t h e c jn v^^ Sat i On betwte^u Mi . Ba l l anl Mx . C^nuVex . 
axxxtx^f u b j e c t e d t o thts ^aest icuxs ux* the ^-ou.^d t h a t the cun v ex SQ t _uxx wuuld be 
ax say ev^dexxce. Tl e ub^ectiuxi ^db sus ta i ixed . 
s> T *"> A A Cs r~ r\ ** ri 1 L.T 1 l i I T A r\ \ O I T - r j _ 1 X 
uxx j uxxe J U , I ^ J U , mx . cuxxuvex n ace aXxULixe^  cu^^cix v,u ^.ie «^rrO WIAX. IXX ^iidi 
l ' ' l l i X . l X . 1 X . X. _ 1 " 1 1 1 - ^ X . 1 X. 1 X. 1 ' T i l 
u x c i i xxe sua t ea x^xa i s. wdb nxs w i ^ . , anc *^e xequeSteu , Lxia~ u.xs _uuy ue 
-m—<i* ^ »«^m *M*^fo *mzm™ m t^ ^m. y»^^® v iiM,m /i^^ot ^AVTM 
1 at Twin Falls, Idaho; that except as modified by that codicil, he 
.... _ J? .. .. Jl .. 1_ 1 _• _ . l . . _7 X. 1. .. A O A f> . . ' I f Jl JL 1 * n A n - - Jl • ... .' "f U _ JL 1. ._ JL . , M 1 
.iineu auu ibpuuiisaeu Liie i VJ<*O wiix anu '^ ne I*J*SJ uuuiuii L U LUCIL w i n . 
5n April 8, 1952, a policy of fire insurance covering the building on the 
.e Valley property was issued to Mr. Conover. Prior to April 1955, the 
.owing endorsement or amendment was attached to that policy. It is 
*rstood and agreed that the name of the insured under this policy [*178] 
lereby corrected to read as follows: ' M-. 0. and Naomi Conover, trustees, May 
'949, recorded July 29, f53, In 1955 Mr. Conover obtained a new policy oi 
rrance on the building. M. 0. and Naomi Conover, as trustees, were named as 
11
 insureds" under that policy. Naomi testified that the premiums on tne 
Lcies were paid from trie joint account. 
r .. A rj rr o %T . _ ... ; _. _ i .1 11 A A r\ c _ _ J_ tf / _ _ . . . i . _ 1 JL _• .. 1 1 \ _ c JL i. .. •* _ _ .. JI ^ . — _ p i -.,1. 
in \ vuo iNduiiu a u x u IUU i e e i ^ a JSUJJS Lctii L L <±L p e t i t ; u i Liie HI my a.nu r m v y U I U J 
p e r t y t o V i v i a n H i l l ( p l a i n t i f f ) . Naomi t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e and Mr. C o n o v e r 
L f i A* A r\ n r\ r\ rs .. 11 _ __ JL I . _ •*
 x _ J I *t ^ 1 ... 1 _ JL . . 
L $ f u u / U u u u r mux e ui i t n e hi 'my a n a LMavy u I uu p r u p y x i y . 
-s . . *•» ... i_ _ . „ x n 4 n r r »#_. ,<-*_... _ _ , JI • _ J? m i . _ . _ • i n _ JC TS _ . . _ . . . i_ A r\ A n A o -, -..- Ji 
j i i LMuvfejiuufeji 1 / , i 3 J u , ivix'• uunuVfcjx a i e u . i i i e w i i x u i ijeeceiuijex i u , i ^ ^ i o , a n u 
u u u i u x x S u i r t t u r u a r y -^  , i ^ ^ r i , d i iu j U a y ou , • :J :J U , wts re a u m i n « u I U p x u u c L L e . 
fui d e c l i n e d t o a c t a s an e x e c u t r i x , and V i v i a n was a p p o i n t e d e x e c u t r i x . 
_ _ JC X. _ _ . * T _ _ . . . .' - C C - , , . _ Jl JL _ ._ - - . JL _ T T .' - . ! I ! L 1 . -C ! _ . - . JL * . . _ JL . 1 1 L i ! _ JT JL 1 . _ A* 
iHcii.t«i LNduisu uiieitJU iu pay iu vivitin ^ii& x. i x ;s L II:S3 LCLI iiueiiL ux, tuts £ 
000 which under the trust agreement was payable by Naomi to Vivian. Vivian 
used to accept the offer, and on April 11, 1957, she commenced this action. 
There were four causes of action in the complaint. In the first cause of 
ion plaintiff sought a judgment declaring the trust agreement invalid. In 
second cause of action plaintiff sought a judgment declaring that Mr. 
. . i. _ Ji ,. _ i_ _ JI L i. _ J JL _ .. _ ... L i . . _ JL i- . A r\rr r\ _. .. JI .•_._• i -r .. L i. _ JL I . _• . . JI _ . _ . . _ . _ 
uv«r iiciu x eVuis.eu Liie u'usi ciuryeiiiyaL uy une S^:JU uuuicii, in tnt? iniiu uctuisfc: 
action, plaintiff sought to quiet title to the property referred to in the 
st agreement. In the fourth cause of action, plaintiff sought to rescind and 
eel the trust agreement. 
The court found as follows: The Apple Valley property was not acquired and 
d by Mr. COUOV&T as his separate property but was acquired by the use of the 
>arate property of Naomi and the community property of Mr. Conover and Naomi, 
it was thereafter held by Mr. Conover and defendant as community property 
il May 5, 1949. (The date the trust agreement and deed were executed.) Mr. 
lOver did not revoke or rescind the grant deed conveying the property to Naomi 
[ him as trustees, and he did not revoke the trust agreement. The trust 
^eement is valid, and by reason of the death of Mr. Conover Naomi will own the 
)le Valley property as her separate property after paying the sum of $ 10,000 
Vivian as provided in the trust agreement. After the execution and delivery 
the trust agreement, M. 0. Conover collected the rents from the property but 
i not remain in exclusive possession of the property. All rents from said 
;perty were treated and considered by Mr. Conover [* 17 9] and Naomi as 
uuunity property. After the execution of said documents, Mr. Conover did not 
.a or intend to hold said property as his separate property and exclude Naomi 
Jin all right to the property. The grant deed and the trust agreement are not 
stamentary in character, and those documents were intended by Mr. Conover arid 
m^i "to become, and were, operative during their lifetime." The trust 
reement and deed are not ambiguous, uncertain, or unintelligible, and the 
ieiiciaries can be ascertained "during tne lifetime1 or Mr. Conover and Naomi. 
i _ _. L _.. .* T i _ .. JI JL _ ... J- _ ... JL - - Ji _. - Ji - • - . - • i ~< - r %».. r ^ ^ rr ^  rr i ,-. _ .. JI • JI '.. _ x. 
1 ici^SL w 1 1 j . c l i iU L e S L d U U e i i L cLXiU CJCJU X C i i S U i iv iX'. I :'"Z)Z,i j UUiiUVei' UJLU UUL 
_ _ 1 _ _ L. 1 . _ Jl _ _ Jl . . . . JL 1_ - _ - . . . _ . - JL f» T-. r Jl .. ._ L r *«r . . _ . . . • 1 _ . . . _ _ 1 . . . . 1 . Jl . _ 
/Ui^ .fci Liifci u e e c i ux v.x'U!SL ctu £ efciiuwu L . ije.fejiiud.iii.
 ; ^ d u n u j xitevex' a d i ' D u r e u <^ ^^ y 
:ent- secret or otherwise; to divest M. C. Conover of any property owned by 
•^m. #i#mi v ff^-«m /lr^^t ^A W ^ T M 
Defendant did not mi siepresent any facts to M. 0. Conover, did not exext 
undue influence upoxx M. 0. Coiiover axxd did xxot take axxy advantage 01 M. 0, 
ver." within one year after the executioxx of the ti ust agreemexxt Mi . Conover 
w^'ucti au/-.ce concexixing said grant deed and trust agreemexxt anu ne Knew txxe 
en<~^ axxu iegai e u b c i Liieieun 
he j udgmexxt was as follows: The grant deed aAxd the trust agreement are 
d; upon the payu'ient by Naomi of $ 10,000 to Vivian Kill (plaintiff), 
ividually," or by the deposit of said sum in any bank "in favor of" Vivian 
>x befoxe November 17, 1959, Naomi shall convey the Apple Valley property to 
>elf as her separate property; upon paymexit of $ 10,000 by Naomi to Vivian, 
an shall have xiO f ux thex intexest ixx the propexty; Vivian, "individually, ui 
?xecutrix of the estate of M. 0. Conover, shall recover nothing further from 
jxxdant NaOmi CoxxOVex " ; defexxdaixt shall i icovyr hex costs against Vivian, 
vidually, and as executrix. 
appellant cox'xtexxds that the trust agreement is invalid for the reason that 
Cunover diiiC Naomi were trustoxs, trustees, aiid beneficiaries of the trust, 
states that it is fundamental that a person cannot be trustor, trustee, ax'xu 
* : • _ • _ _ r i • _ _ . L , t T* . i-»_ __ ^*_ / -» • _ ! _ A n r\ *r n A A r n ^ n - r ^ r ^ ^ n f y n i 
i i i u . a i y u i u 11> uwii n u s L . xu r x y v . W L L U I iiticx^ , i / u r\axx. / <± i \.A<LO xr . z.u , ^  / ., , 
p l a i n t i f f s s o u g h t t o s e t a s i d e an o i l l e a s e which t h e y had e x e c u t e d a s 
s t e e s . In a f f i x ming a judgment fox defendaxxt, i t was s a i d : " A p p e l l a n t s 1 
st cox'xtent ioxi i s t h e t r u s t agreement i s i n v a l i d b e c a u s e i t a p p o i n t s t h e 
ixs of t h e px opei ty a s t h e tx u s t e e s t h e x e o f . They i x i s i s t a s o l e benef i c i a r y 
a t r u s t c a a n o t be t h e s o l e t r u s t e e t h e r e o f ax'id c o n v e r s e l y t h a t a s o l e t r u s t e e 
i t r u s t c diinot be [*180] t h e s o l e benef i c l ax" y t h e r e o f , c i t i n g 
u a t e m e x x L , I X U S L S , J :? 3 { u ) axxa j i \'o{'0). m a t s t a u e m e x x t xxeeu n o t u e A d j u i e u . 
l a S o u n u . x L i s u a s e u oxx Lxxe eis LCIJ i i sxxeu. p x ^ n o i p i e ^+i<x^ i-. t ;xe x u * e wex e 
i i w i s e t h e l e g a l t i t l e and t h e e n t i r e bex'xeficial ix 'xterest would be merged in 
same p e r s o n who u u u l d f u l l y d ^p'~>se of t h e pxopextv c^s a**y o t h e r owner . In 
3x" words t h e r e would be no s e p a r a t i o n of t h e l e g a l axxd b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t 
h e n c e xxO t r u s t r e 1 a t ioxiSxx i p . 
" T h a t , however i s no t t r u e under t h e t e r m s of t h e p r e s e n t i n s t r u m e n t . Here 
x e a x e f c u x t x u ^ t e e S . T r u e t h e y a x e a l s o J b u b f i c 1 ax i e y b u t e a c h i s a t r u s t e e 
o n l y of h i s own b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t bu t a l s o fo r t h e b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t of 
? _ / T J I _ x i_ _ _, _ fT . i . . r u i _ . _ c • • . • _ i _ _ _ • x „ i i • x _ _ u 
xi Ui i.iw u Gneiss. nex e edtu ui uie jexxe_ . c i ax
 A e;s .iacs an equitauie iiKHiys, 
ch is sepai ate from the legal interest held by the whole gxoup. No ox\e of 
txust^e^ without the cuncux rexxce of the others could propexly txansfer axx 
ivided legal interest in the property free of the trust, The same sectloxxs 
the t e ,L t flOit Restatement on Txusts xel led upon by appellants state the xule 
T .• _ _ i . T _ J _ _ x v _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . . x _ _ _ _ «-« _ _ x ' _ r\ r\ t A \ . . „ i _ . i T f x i _ _ . . _ . _ l 
i i i c w . e LU t ^ e p ^ e ^ e i i v . t _ a ^ e . o e c j L i o n r r> { H } i eau^> . 11 ^n&i& a i e s e v y i d i 
e f i c i a x i e s of a t i u s t , t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s may be t r u s t e e s . ' 
- n i ' J i * i j Lixe p i m c i p i e -.i=> 55 *-a «-ec c o n v e x s e x y d.z> 1 0 1 1 u w s . 11 t n e x e a x e 
e £ a J. t r u s t e e s o f a t x u s t , t l xe tx u j s t ee s s may b e bexxef i c i a r i e s o f a t x ' U S t . 1 " 
In t h e p r e s e n t c a s e t h e i e were two t r u s t e e s , Mr. Conover ax'xd Naomi. N e i t h e r 
s t e e w a s s o l e bexxef i c i ax y , axxd t h e l e g a l t i t i e axxd t h e e x x t x x e x j e x x e f l c i a l 
ex e s t 1 xx t h e propex"ty was iiOt meiged in them ox ixx e i t h e r 01 tnem. Mx . 
Uv'ei w&zs t o x e c e i v e t h e ixe t iixuOme f x Om t h e p x O p e x t y d u x i i x g h i s l i f e t i m e , 
t h e r t r u s t e e c o u l d have t x a n s f e i x e d t h e p i o p e i t y w i t h o u t t h e c o n c u r r e n c e of 
1
 o t n e " t x u s t e e . Tne t r u s t was t o t e r m i n a t e upon t he d e a t h of e i t h e x t r u s t e e . 
1
 su rv iv ing" t r u s t e e c o u l d not p x o p e i l y t x a n s f e i t h e p r o p e r t y , or i n t e r e s t 
' i e i n , f x ' e e o f t h e t r u s t px i o x t o t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e n o t e r e f ex'x e d t o i x"x 
» — m rm**mffr K t w m WW**fo 5^iWM»TM 
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u i e u 
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agreement. The persons who were to receive the note, Vivian/ u Mr. Cuauver 
[ first, andrast. Thei e was no merger of the legai anu 
eqci LdiJie u Lies. 
appellant contends that the trust agreement is invalid for the reason tnat it 
, estamentary in nature and [*181j it was nut subscribed by two witnesses. 
argues that the evidence and the agreement "overwhelmingly demonstratec' 
that the agreement should take effect only 
i the death of one of them. In connection with that argument she rerers to 
following provisions of the agreement: Mr. Conovei was to receive the net 
;me from the property during his lifetime; he and Naomi were to manage and 
-I'ol the property; the survivor was to receive the property and execute a 
i for $ 10/00 0 (payable to Vivian in the event Mr. Conover uieu, or payaDie 
:he representative of Naomi's estate if Naom; 
/-"»_i A A o r A A ••-> A A A A r ft -n ... <-* x. T-I_._ X A I _• J_ 
it ion of a valid express trust it is essentia.
11 be conveyed to the trustee/ and, when the 
=jr than a will, that estate or interest must pass immediately. [Citation.] 
such a trust/ therefore, something of the settler's estate nas passec irom 
anu IXILO Liie wi'.iSLtfb IUI Liie uene_ i L U I Lne uesLui, am. 
=?rest is a present one and in nowise dependent upon the settler's death. But 
is important to note the distinction between the interest transferred and the 
Dyment of that interest. The enjoyment of the cestui may be made to commence 
and depend for its commencement upon the teimination of an 
sting life or lives or of an intermediate estate." In the present case, Mr. 
over and Naomi executed a grant deed conveying the property to themselves as 
in the property passed 
provisions of the trust agreement that the trustees were to pay the net 
ume from the property to Mr. Conover during his lifetime, that Mr. Conover 
Naomi were to manage the pi opt-x ly, aud that the survivor was to receive the 
perty upon the execution of a note as referred to in the agreement, did not 
e the trust agreement test amenta! y. The/e was an im.ueuiate transfer of 
le. Furthermore, the provisions of the deed (conveying the property to Mr. 
over and Naomi as trustees), the amendment of the fire insurance policy 
sued in 1952. changing the name of the insured from Mr. Conover to the 
stees}, and the new policy (issued in 1355, naming tne trustees as "the 
r. Conover and Naomi intended 
t the deed and the trust agreement should become effective immediately. 
i ' ioz,j rtppe i A an L couLenus LIICLL IVIX . uouovei i evoi^eu tne L I U S L agxeemenL xjy 
She argues to 
over owned the Apple Valley property as hi^ sepaiate property when the trust 
eeiuent a^^ 5 made, he was the only trustor and therefore he could revoke the 
-i- _ J L - JLI.-JL - . • . - _ JL i. _ _ _ _n • _ .• i _ c T . . . _ A A A r\rr r\ 
;S>L ayieement/ ^na<- since Lne oouioii 01 june o L> , I^OJ 
- .. I_ . _. A r\ A r\ ,i n _ i_ . . • . i . L 1 _ •n.- •» _ T T _ T T _. ,_,_._._. J _ „ J _ _ ... . i T _ . i. 
emjjei \ v , . ^^o, w»«itn: ne uave une npp * e v a n e y piopeiLy L O appe i i an L 
vian) anu Naomi, the effect of the codicil was to dispose of the property trdiy to the urovis '.'Ji;^  cf the iust agreement and to revoke at agr ement 
f record in the name < 
s maae. Tnere was a Is 
- - ~ - -* A rr n A r t , J _ I . _ J L / * A rr A A A _ jr 
w<lb ru _;;j , u U u , L i i d L ty z.O , 'J u u o 1 
re was evidence that the Apple Vail 
man, w£ien the trust agreement wa d h l o 
amount was pa*d from the proceeds of the sale of the market bullc 
Conover had transferred to Naomi under the prenuutial 
-~*—TM • i^^m *w^*<m v iw-«m / W ^ * « > A W T M 
?ement; that the balance of the purchase price (S 10,000) was representee oy 
;te and trust deed; that rentals from the Apple Valley property were 
;sited ix"i the joint bank account; ax'id thdt payment of $ 5,00u ior 
"ovements on the property and paymexxts on [**52J] the note we; e made ii'uifi 
. account. The court found that the Apple Vdlley property was not acquired 
\i . Conover as his separate property but was acquiied by the use 01 tne 
irate property of Naomi and the community property of Mr. Conover and Naomi. 
evidence above stated was substantial evidexice to support txiat _. inc._.xxg". 
_ion 2280 of the Civil Code provides, "Unless expressiy maue irrevocaoie oy 
ixxstiumexit creating the trust, every voluntary trust ^hall be levocaoie Dy 
trustor by writing filed with the trustee. When a voluxrtary trust is 
jy^eu oy Lae L I U S L O I , >.ae Liu__iLee ^^.dxi -idiis^ei -_.o wie LI us^ux i L S x u a L I L x e 
the trust estate." Mr. Conover was not the only trustor; he aad Naomi were 
tiusto;s learned In the tiust agreemexxt and they were the trustees. Tnei e was 
evidence that Naomi sigx'-ed any document revoking the trust agreemexit or that 
Conuvei gave hex the or igixxal or d copy uf the codicil uf June 30, "950, or 
t he "filed" axxy writing with her revolving the dgreement . The trust 
^emex:L dau ue e u ^ei e e x e C u L e u ixx . r? <H_ 2 . ivn , wOXiOvei u i e u ixx •> uuo . iaeie wcia 
evidence that Mr. Conover or Naomi, as trustees, or otherwise, transferred 
property, or any interest therein, to Mi . Conover or to Naomi oi to axxy one 
5. after the trust agreement was executed. 
r * A n *> i t-i . JLI * * _ * - % • » ! x . x .• r • _i . . . _ .1 • . . «. i _ _ _ . x • _ r- 1 i. . 
[ " t o j 1 r ui Lae 1 mux e , mi . cd-_ L « s a i i « u iega iu_ .ny ~xxe d ; ; eLuuu i i o_ Lxae 
. _ .• i _ j r -r,. . _ ~> rs A rs rr rs _ _ r _. 1 1 - * * . . r-* _ _ . _ x _ *#.. «*-i _ T i i . _ AT jr . _ _ . . . JI 
i c a 01 J uae J U , i ^ j y , dss i u a u w s i , mi . ooxxove,. odme LO IVII . n a i l s ox. 1 i c e dxxu 
d t h a t he and h i s wife wyi e go ing t o CexAtrdl Amer ica ; i f he d i e d dowxx t h e r e 
wanted t o be b u r i e d in Twin F a l l s ; he w a a t e c i t in w r i t i n g ; he wanted t o make 
1 1 1 T T . / * w _ T > _ " T " r - v _ _ _ " » • 1 L 1 _ L f ! _ . '. 1 1 . . 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ " » . • _ . • 1 I f f » _ _ _ T 1 _ J1 
1 i _. . ne ^rai. jDd.11; r e y i i e c u i d i v^ e VVJ.II mdx\e a c o u n c i l , ne c a i _. eu. a 
r e t a r y and t o l d h e r what Mr. Conovei w a n t e a . Tae s e c r e t a r y p i e p a r e a t h e 
'. c l ! , Mi . CuiiOvei ajLiled i t axxd l e f t t n e o f f i c e . Tae t i a s t agi eemeat wds a o t 
A. * _ . . _ .1 _ X X 1. - X X ' . _ 
L i o x i e u dL L a d L L i m e . 
m l . _ _ _ . . X . J? - . . . . 1 i_ 1 _ A. X I . _ T _ _ X _ _ . ' T 1 _ . . J1 _ _ J1 • _ ' 1 _ - ^ * # . /->• , - - - 1 ' 1 - X . . 1 _ _ 
H i e C O U I L l o u x i u ' a d - Lxie i d S L w 1 1
 x axxu c o u l o i r s 01 **JI . ooixovex m u XXOL 1 evoi^e 
deed or t r u s t a g r e e m e n t . Thei e was subs t a a t i a l evidex'xoe, a s above s t a t e d , 
_ x x 1. _ x r • . i • . .. 
SSUppUJ L L a d L * . X U U X I i L . 
Appellant contends that the evidex'xce does not support the findings that Naomi 
er hai boi ed any intexxt to divest Mi . Cox'*ovei of axxy property owned by him, 
t Naomi did act misrepresent any facts to nini or unauly influence him or take 
advaatage of him. She argues that a confidential relationship existed 
ween Mr. Conover and Naomi; that the Apple Valley property W^LS the separate 
perty of Mr . Conover; that by the trust agr eemeixt Naomi cotaiaed an advantage 
r him in that she succeeded in obtaining the entire x_ee to the property 
• L _ 1 ' . .1 . • _ . _ . _ i - . . . i t.1. - . . ' I T JC T > _ _ _ i_ . . A r\ A r>, 1 n 1. . ' 
1 ^dLts i L ^ci^> * a b u b b a e , ats sxxowxx u y LXie ^ a . o „ ^ e o e m r ; e i j , 'j^o, ^u ' ^ i v e a. 
C I X . - _ X * . X I . _ X . X - 1 f . . . - 1 1 - . X . S _ . - T _ 1. 1 C ' . X _ _ 4 X X _ * f _ . 
JL l a L e i e s L ±IL ^iie pi ope i 1 y LO ae i 1 -sppyadiiw 1 aa.«^  a *»a 1 - . . . lyxe^w L.U J IU '; i . 
r. LI. - . ii xi. _ _ _ _ _ _ . r L. 1 _ _ r , - » . x • _ i T x ' _ _ i • _ _ - l x i _ 
argt.ies xua . . id; s_*_.a.L _jy 1 eajso_i 01 Lae L U i a i L e i . w i : 1 e _ <-i _. _. o;:sxx - ^  , a.iL ...ae 
a n t a g e g a i n e d by h e r . Naomi had t h e bu rden of showing t h a t t h e t r a n s a c t i o n 
.r * . _ . - i _ t - -1 _ _ • . _ _ _r . . T . _ • „ r 1 T XT x K-»_ • 1 • jy . _ x 
U J I , 1 ea__>oxxa_j i e, axxu _.iee . 1 UH. unuue 1 a- 1 uexxoe, a__u Lixar aaomi u.u XXOL 
sent such evidence. As above stated, there was evidence that the Apple 
ley property was acquired with the proceeds from th - isal _; of the market 
1 .1 .' .. .. .* .. T .1 . 1. . _ -1. „• _ 1. »#_. f^t _ .. V _ _1 J C _. _ _1 x - *•» - _ . . -' ...-_!_.. X 1. _ 
iuiag xa iuaao wA_±cn mi • ooaovei a a'-, L 1 axxsi. ei 1 eu L O I M U H U unu«_ v.ae 
•nuptidx agreemexxt; that paymexxts on the note (note L.vei. for balaixce of 
chase price) were made from the joint account! that the rentals from the 
•perty weie deposited in that account. There was no evidence that a 
.iiuentiai relationship existed between Mr. Conover and Naomi at the time the 
L'.jpt id! agr ee.'exxt was executed. 
-r_. _-__.** _. • • • « _r«__-^^ -/AV-iTM W •—«m _fW__F^ (R) W I-P"*^ _f • __T*»(R) _#_KtB_PTM 
r. Ball testified that Mr. Coaover was "very active mentaiiy, ana ne was 
t_ . . . . if J. _ t *i 
,"ppei ldht (Vivian) testified that Mr. Conover was competent to ta*ce care oi 
business; his mind was keen; and lie was fairly active and vigorous LOT OO 
s of age. 
*184] The evidence was sufficient to support the findings. 
'he judgment is affirmed. 

In tne Matter of the Accounting of Chemical Corn Exchange 
Barus., as Trustee of Trust Made by John K. Race and Anotner 
r t . ... _ <•-« _ . . _ . JL _ C «.T .. _ . i p .. . . 1 . /-• : . 1 m .. _ , . . . * ^ T r .. . . 1 _ «—»._ . . - . JL. _
 r 
caupx t-iu« u u u i ' L UJL ne»A' I U I A , d ^ e c I a, i i e x m , LNWW t u a v uu l i i i t y 
» ^ # - N T m-r / -N* t . n i l . _ _ ._ ._ 1 • _. _ JL .• j _ _ ' . .1 .' . , .' . 1 1 . . . . . i l l . J\ _ 1 1 JL 1. _ , _ . _ . _ . . . . . JL. . ' . . _, C - .„.. 
' u o i i i u r j ; liiw d p p i i c c i t i u n LU l u u i C i d H y d e m y a a u d i I U W Liie d u u u u n i . a i y i u x 
. . _ _ - . . ' _ ."» JT -r. i . _ /< 4 r» , t n JL _ IP * * >* r\ rr r~ •? c _ _ . .». i- _ x. v .. ... - . "» ' - / " . .. _ . JL _ .t 
p e r i u u i i ' u m u u i y i , \ :i*-±v I U u u a e i *± , s J J O a a u LUX v-iie U L I I W I r e u a i xequteJ^Ltsu 
[ r a n t e d in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e s t i p u l a t i o n a g r e e d t o by t h e v a r i o u s p a r t i e s * 
, 1e o r d e r . 
•ZB&ment t h a t t l 
;bad niOK^pommsss^ 
dix'.y i cs tiSTflfP' 
••BMHK.dea.th:.. of .-.otinsBr. 
MM •jiiiiiiimiiiiimilliiinnriimiinaaEe, p r o v i u « u * *i | am, afj^ y 4MT'¥ *¥*>« t i u^ i 
te^raEGDuld riei^mtarrac^^ i t s t e r i i t a r a t ^ 
h ^ d r n o power - t o - d o « 3 W * £ t o a t r ^ h ^ ^ ^ 
I. That- the deceased <*^tMCM^MIPl^^ 
sutor did not give the survivor the-right to revoke*" or * modify;-- A -sett lor *'SF 
*r to revoke a trust under the P«*i tooi^ct-L^F^^ to' 
^or, and terBijaaxe^ o a ) 1 X S I deati^. 
ISEL» Lowenstein, Pitcher, Spence,. Kotchkiss, Amann S Parr for trustee. 
fames P. Hoopes fox" cross petitioners. 
)ebevoise, Plimpton S McLean for Robert Dongdon. 
i . . _i ... -p-i _ . i _ . . i r _ ... -r . . T . . * - » _ _ . . 
i a u r « w ^ c i ^ e i i .ui i j u i u rccLcw . 
JILO . uwen nubi v e r a , u 
r * x r r i r ^ + r A I i 
. s is an application lor a judicial settlement 
iter vivos trust and fox; a construction. 
!Yie settlors herein are John K. Pace and his wife, Alice Bannister Race, 
. _ L . .1 rr _ .• .. J_ . .. ... * .... I. .. . L ... i •.._*-.!__ i i .1 • » - > _ _ . -n. . *» _. JL i. r^_ J. 
*-T. G. S-. T. Trust, Race-Corn Exchange Trust and Race-Chattanooga Trust 
i trust terminated upon the death of the survivor of the donors. 
fing a wixx wherem she devised and bequeathed all her property to her 
I ti\ .^AW^M TU • <A ^ A V ^ T H 
di iJ . , d x ^ u i i d i i unL h i in e ^ y t u t u j . On A j ^ u b t " e , 
J JII* r j . ^ y -» e a t ^ d **ia>Li« m e n t i s m u u i 1/1X1^ 
1 U L L U J t t I < - U , 
Jr. - e e H i 
^  •=- ^^wvA . i o . i i  d i T y i n g u i 
i x* x. n r* J. i n i i r x n 
l i e i i l b l H l O L i l * L c l l i U i i U d l i e u 1 ** 
i e e V t - » u t !3 . ^ ' e l i c i t 
C J . 1 . U d < j d i l i U I 
duie i idx i ig t h e F d t e - T . G. *< 
a ^ L i i i t n e i i t u f Gx l e i 0 . M u x ^ d u 
^LedbfcJL h i m . T h e :=>euuiid 
U l ^ u e b j 
wdLicjii L i l  u i >.i e a ^ j p L i i i u i e m . u^ ux l e i ^ . r 
^t. udc «1st R d t e , t h e u i i ^ i i i d l t x u b t e t i u a u e d , 
J mud i f i u d t i j i i u d l l e d fux u e i t a i n u n d i g e ^ x i t i 
-r T 1 f* 1 x 1 T^ r n <"• n r*i U . U L ^ I I j e a ^ f x L i d x x e b i d neu _n t h e ? i u e i x a ^ L 
MJarnr Exchange Trt imli i^^ 
tiein Consequent l y ^ r c t e ^ ^ ±±iS ' s e t t r l t r r s :ded ib&ratHly^raacte 
e r ^ n t ^ r n v i s Ioris HWBWgSBWIBq^^ ^ r e i r o t e ^ i r i ^ 
i e o t i v e feraa&ss 
d i d ^ i d p i i C i i u i li u i L e n c L u e - i . o . cv 1 . I X U ^ L i n u e u L u x e u i u uuxiLdix* d 
l
x v d t i U i i u f d p u ^ e i t u m o d i f y t h e t e x i i i b u f t h e *JU£> L* u uen t . P n i d ^ i d ^ I i S i ^ i ' . h 
^I2g^*«pa^^ uf -i j - ' i " - ' 1 ? ^x^putwc? lixstTtmexflrrmratrfY^aacI 
r
 t h * t e r m s of t h i s ^ i ^ i i s t - r m ^ ma^a±f*smyHe^ 
annu l t h i s t r u s t inBt 'r^meTTt'^i^^ 
• a n e e l l e d o r a n n u l l e d , " 
»bA ^ « i t i o * , th*** t> ,vol^wtn .a*Hh^thaT t h e f u i ^ g u i n g paraaranhr^smhyt^ii^iaKha^id1" 
i p u s t r u e d a s p e r m i t t i n g d i e powei u£ x e / o c d t i o i * f modificaticuacr '**CG2] 
n a t i o n o r amendment t u b<* H Y M > ( n ^ ^ i 5 p 3 B l T r i * B r ^ ^ 
ad^ath of h i s w i f e , A] ru* PA> *» • ^i «>^par»e o r w h e t h e r such pcrwer c o u l d be -
saxjs^d o n l y by t h e jnu tua l a c t of b o t h j k m o r s d u r i n g t h e l i f e t i m e of b o t h of* 
>uld nu lungex be exeri2^*§*fei*l^ of 
b e r e v o k e d 7 a l t e r e d o r amended ilk*&GnJ&~tip6SK^±h& 
t i n g of t h e t r u s t i n s t r u m e n t r e l a t i n g t h e r e t o * ' 3 S u u t t u.A Txu&Lss, ' ' 33C, 
I h e d o n o r s s p e c i f i u a l l y p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e t r u s t " i n s t r u m e n t ~eoirh± t>#* 
JLxedLby mutua l conaenc of t h e donor»v*t:cr be s e t " - f o r t h r i r m p r o p e r l y - ^ e x ^ c u t e d 
3WiMir£. %&e l a n g u a g e used t h u s u^^itempl^ixed^a^^odx f i x a t i o n e x e c u t e d Hb* -4^^4it 
BEt. 
MKGx»oker*v*. ^Crofcf x f 1A 7 y i&u. 558) 
m t u r e p r o v i d e d t h a t ^ l t r ^ c c u l d * b e a l t e i e d f 
h e l d t h a t * t^hierw-thw* trxrstr 
-)d i f 1 ed , r evuked o r changed by* 
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it iff persoi'ially with $ 2,133.33, which she claims as her share (one-third) 
ie tuLdi incjume CLL tne rate ui rp ^ ,uuu a yeax irum uecemuex z,u, i 3 i *± , to 
1, 1016. I think Mrs. Morris must fail in this contention, as the evidence 
$ that she was excluded from participation during this period by the express 
JLiuus CJ^ iier icLLiiei . -ijciLei- in u Une, i 3 i a , Liie ueiHaudhc niCuaxu ox cm ex 
21ed the plaintiff to make an equ a1 d i st r i bu t i on of the $ 5,000 of i ncome 
J his tax ee children. This direction was given in a letter received by 
iLiti iium m s lauiiex ILL J une, i r i u . t i d l i a u l was uaauie cu linu Liie 
22" in question, and was allowed to state its contents fx'om his recollection, 
"lis testimony on this point was corroborated to some extent by Exhibit S, 
:?u uv ueiexiuaxiL niciiaru u i u ^ m uecemuel- i i, i r? i o , ana in wiiiUn ne uuiiiiiiits 
Lorrner verbal dir'ection and states that the income is thereaftex" to be 
led equally among his thx^ ee children, Florence, Ethel, and Howard. Pursuant 
"iese directions of his father the plaintiff made equal distributions of the 
tie up to $ 5,00 0 among the three ohildx'en named, making the first payment to 
sistein Florence on July 1 , 191G, and he continued to make these payments 
! X. 1_ _ "I _ X. X. _ ., -_ JL --C T > _ _ . 1. _ _, A CI A C> m l . . _ JC X. 1. . _ . _ _ _ . _ Jl ... _ 1_ „• _ _ __ J 
L Lne l a u e f paxL ui uecjemuex , i r> i 3 . i uer eai. i« r xie ueaseu md.is.111u payments 
JL income to anybody, because he received written directions fx'om his 
sr, dated May 21, 1320, to pay the entire income of the trust fund to him, 
pt $ 1 ,GG7 ther^eof, which the lattei" dix^ected plaintiff to pay each year to 
laught er F1 orence C . Mo2"r i s . 
i is my [*56 6] opinion that the trustee has properly disbursed the income 
Liie trust l unu; axiu i a duu:uy ti.e e-^cesis ui income ovex *p u,uuu to tne 
jipal the plaintiff acted under authority of the owner'" of the excess. The 
ixn cannot now, after many year's of acquiescence in that course, and after 
Income derived from the principal so increased has been paid over to 
:iciarmies designated by the owner of the excess, disavow plaintiff's action 
charge him personally with the payments so made, ana with the additions to 
principal fund of the trust. The payments of interest were properly made, 
the additions to the pr inc ipa1 cannot now be taken theref Tom. The principal 
ie trust fund has been augmented by contributions to it by defendant Richared 
5 2" of his sharne of the income. At his direction the plaintiff paid the $ 
J of income from the fund so increased to tne 'enree uniicren, jout ceased to 
--___..._. J_ _. 1 J 1 _ - . _iT 1. .' _. JT _ j_ V _.- »# O A A n n A J\ 1._ _ _ 1 £ 
paymeiiLss uy ux uei ui ais latiiex' un iviay z, i , i^^u, <±a^ ne asKS lur 
ructions as to his future administrat roii of the txust. Shall he continue to 
jse of the income as foi'merly and at the death of Kichard C2"oker, Sr. , pay 
/ i 2 uvex- Lii& px iucipdi iu tne !-nxee c^ixiuxeii, ox mti^ st ne uuey Liie 
^tion of Mr. Croker, 'and henceforth pay all the income to him during his 
r ana thereaf tex" distx'ibute the principal of the trust among the three 
.T . . c\ 
iiexi ; 
'ie plaintiff and defendants Ethel C. White and Howarc Cromer Cidiiii Lnat in 
A C\ A r 1.1. 1 .. JT _ . . ! . . 1. T-, : . .1. . .. J» /-*,..•»._ "I _ I_ . .' JL 1. J_ 1- - -- 1 - -* - 4- -' •£" -C 
, i y « o , s,;ie u e i e a u d i i i n i u i i d i u u l u i i e r nictuy a n d u i e w m t t i a wi J I Liie p i d i i i t i i i 
JI _ .C _ .. JI _ .. X. _ *#_. _ ril. .' X _ _ ... JI T T .. Jl /-».._ 1_ 1- - r 0- 1. _ X. _. _ -T . .1. .' .,1. X. 1. _ 
Jtei euucLii L;S M I S . w j n e anu nuwdiu uruKer, uy m e teiius ui waion Liie 
"it iff, during the lifetime of Mr. Croker, should pay over to his cnixdren 
L, rioienoe, dau nuwdiu, SIICL: e anu aadie aii^e, ai I ui Liie income oi uue 
trust estate to the extent of $ 5,000 annually. The alleged agreement, it 
Iaimed, further provided that all sums over $ 5,000 should be added to tne 
jipal of said trust estate arid made [*557] part thereof, and it is 
j'ed in the answers of these defendants, Howard Croker and Mrs. White, that 
_ _ „- - r . . i - - A A n A r JI 1.1. . o - 4 - x . _ r •* _. x A r\ A n .__ _ ._ x. _ ___.._ ... _ JT _ x_ _ x. i. _ 
=*en uuiy ., i^!o, anu uia J ISL O L H U U U S L , i a i 3 , pay men L S Wei e maue L O Lixe 
=* children pursuant to this agreement. In none of the pleadings is any 
[deration alleged for the making of the agreement as pleaded nor do I find 
"ie testimony sufficient evidence upon which to base a finding that such an 
ii'usiit was ever made. On the contrary, it seems clear to me that Mr. Cromer 
a gift of this income to his children as a voluntary act, to continue, not 
ssar i1y dur ing his 1i fet ime, but dur ing his pieasure. 
: therefore follows that the whole income from the trust fund since the date 
--1. 1 _."!- 1. _ .1 i . X. _ JI -' X. X. _ 1- _ ._ _ .' JI X. _ 1. ' .. 1. _ 1 _ .. X. . JI - JT JT . „ X. TI * _.7_ _ .. .1 s-i.. _ 1_ 
waiCii ne uiieoLeu n to ue paiu L O XIIIU ueiongs L O ueienuaiiL rcioaaiu oioKei-, 
jt the amount directed by him to be paid to his daughter Florence. Findings 
ict and conclusions of law as proposed have been passed upon. Other 
ings should be proposed in accordance with the views expressed in this 
L on. 
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will gave no additional guidance on how the 
educational trust was to be administered. 
W When the parties signed their Prop-
erty Settlement Agreement in 1978, they 
fulfilled all th« requirements for the cre-
ation of a trust (summarized earlier) except 
the eUfrfeeaee of the trust property, Even 
the frupeHy requirement would have been 
fttWWd^f the parties had transferred or 
ctafcut&a trust of the interest they owned 
in the Big Bear Property. But the agree-
ment evidences no intent to do this. In-
stead, the parties agreed "that income de-
nted from the interest held by the parties 
in tiie . . . Big Bear Property should be 
established as a family trust " By this 
reference to "income derived" and this use 
of *should" in the sense of duty, the parties 
tfiade clear that they were not creating a 
present trust but only imposing an obliga-
tion to create a trust thereafter, and that 
the subject matter of the trust was not to 
be the property then owned but the income 
installments to be received in the future. 
The Installments of Income were future 
4ptteplity fn 1973 and thus could not have 
**Jert tfte subject matter of a present ere-
ction of, trust. Brainard v. Commissioner, 
41 K2d 880 (7th Cir. 1937); fiogert, Trusts 
JtTttntm*, f 113 (2d ed 1965), and author-
Hks)elt*d therein Viewing the matter just 
0kUnttm October, 1973, agreement, the par-
Oit bs# In enforceable agreement to create 
mvjfrmt, trat no trust had been created. 
QfcfPW*1 fitly, to to the Big Bear Property 
JjexTas to future income installments, we 
•agfe* with the district court's conclusion 
tttatno trust was created. 
* ffl However, as the parties received 
efcbh installment of income from the Big 
Bear Property, the trust automatically 
e*m«! into existence as to that installment 
TJnVft a consequence of the fact that the 
parties had made an enforceable agreement 
tb create a trust in those installments of 
Income, and the fact that equity would 
therefore treat the trust as having been 
perfected when the income was received. 
A*;-Bogert explains: "When the subject-
matter came into existence and into th * 
hands of the intended settlor, it would at 
once be deemed to be held in trust, without 
any act of appropriation by the intending 
settlor, " Bogert, Trusts A Trustees, 
§ 113 (2d ed 1966), and authorities cited 
therein. The parties' deposit of these in-
come installments in the properly labeled 
trust account in the bank is further confir-
mation of their performance of their agree-
ment to create a trust and of the existence 
and validity of the trust as to those depos-
it* 
If bur conclusion about the creation of 
this trust admitted of any doubt, it would 
surely be resolved by the parties' signature 
on a formal "Addendum to Trust Agree-
ment," by their performance of the trust by 
deposits and disbursements for educational 
purposes over a period of five years, and by 
the fact that the existence of the trust was, 
in effect, confirmed by periodic orders of 
the court that had approved the original 
agreement and supervised the performance 
of what the court's orders repeatedly re-
ferred to as "the trust" or "the Sundquist 
Family Trust." fr 
[&,*] For the reasdna set out above, a 
valid trust was created and exists as to the 
$5^14.28 balance of the bank account, but 
not as to the parties' interest in the Big 
Bear Property or in the future installments 
therefrom. Under Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, § 30-3-6, the district court in a di-
vorce proceeding has "continuing jurisdic-
tion to make such subsequent changes or 
new orders with respect to the distribu-
tion of the property as shall be reasonable 
and necessary." That power does not au-
thorise the court to alter property rights 
already vested in other parties, such as in 
the children who are the beneficiaries of the 
trust in the income already received and 
deposited in the trust account Cf. Hills v. 
Hills, Utah, 638 P£d 516 (1981). But sec-
tion 30-8-5 does authorise the divorce 
court to reallocate property rights be-
tween the parties to the divorce, such 
as by modifying the earlier decree 
as to the parties' interest in the Big 
Bear Property, including installment pay-
* 
SUNDQUIST v, 
CM at, Utah, 
ments not yet received.1 This matter can 
be pursued on remand. 
II. TERMINATION OF TRUST 
In Clayton v. Behle, Utah, 565 P.2d 1132 
(1977), this Court approved and Applied the 
general rule that even though its prescribed 
duration has not passed, the beneficiaries 
can require a court of equity to decree the 
termination of a trust where: (1) all benefi-
ciaries consent, (2) no beneficiary is under 
an incapacity, and (3) the continuance of 
the trust is not necessary to carry out a 
material purpose of the trust. This rule is 
supported by a multitude of authorities, 
including, in addition to those cited in Clay-
ton v. Behle, supra; Ambrose v. First Na-
tional Bank of Nevada, 87 Nev. 114, 4fe2 
P.2d 828 (1971); Bogert, Trusts A Trustees, 
I 1007 (2d ed. 1962); 4 Scott on Trusts 
§ 887 (8d ed. 1967), and authorities cited 
therein.1 ' 
In its findings of fact, the district court 
slated that "one,of the children of the par-
ties desires that any trust should be termi-
nated and the other two have no objection 
to such termination." There were no find-
ings of fact on whether the continuance of 
the trust was necessary to carry out a mate-
rial purpose ot the trust, except as implied 
by the distort court's conclusions of law: 
"the purpose, of any possible trust has been 
accomplished; the children, beneficiaries, 
have no objection to Its termination and the 
trust should be terminated." 
[10-12] At the conclusion of evidence in 
support of respondent's request for termi-
nation, appellant moved to dismiss. That 
motion should have been granted because 
respondent's request for termination failed 
"of proof in Two essentiaf respects. """" 
(1) Respondent failed to prove consent by 
all of the beneficiaries. Appellant, who 
1. The record contains testimony that nine or 
ten future annual payments were then expect-
ed, tai the total amount of approximately $18,* 
000 to $20,000. 
2. A corollary rule, alto referred to In Osyton v 
Behle, supra, that all beneficiaries can termi-
nate a trust even though Its continuance Is 
necessary to carry out a material purpose of 
SUNDQUIST 
tstrjdisi 
owned a beneficial interest 
resisted the termination 
Utah 187 
in, re mainder, 
Moreover, al-
though one of the parties' children consent-
ed that the trust be terminated, the other 
two beneficiary-children did not affirma-
tively consent to the termination As Bo-
gert states, "PI* is well settled that the 
court will not end the trust ai a whole on 
the request of a part onfy of the beneficiar-
ies." Bogert, Trusts A Trustees, | 1007 (2d 
ed. 1962). It is hot sufficient for purposes 
of this rule that beneficiaries "have no ob-
jection to its termination" or take no posf 
tion on the matter. All beneficiaries must 
consent Clayton v. Behle, supra; A.B, v., 
Wilmington Trust Co.t 41 Del.Ch, 191, 191 
A.2d 98 (1968); ttilh v. trstelers Bank A 
Trust Co., 125 Conn. 640, 7 A Ai 662 (1989); 
Closset v. Burtchaell, 112 Or. 585,280 P. 664 
(1924). / 
(2) Respondent also failed to iJrbve fluU 
there w M no -JihfulfilTed pui^ bW of HMT 
trusVwhich could be carried out b^fisjon-' 
timiance" Indeed, the contrary Is dear 
"from the~evidence. Hie purpose of the _ 
trust created by the parties was to provide 
education for their children, with the re-* 
maining trust property to be divided equal-
ly between the parties "at such time as the 
children have received or terminated their 
advanced education ; . . . " At the time Of 
the attempted termination, the three chil-
dren beneficiaries were ages 19%, 22%, arid 
24%. All had attended some college but 
none had yet graduated from college, and 
none had yet attained the age When * ma-
jority of young people who aspire to "ad-
vanced" ot college educations have satisfied 
those aspirations. Two of the three benefi-
ciaries gave evidence eftpressmfr stronjf as-
pirations for further higher education; one 
was then enrolled part time fn a university, 
and the other was in the army, but ex-
pressed his desire to continue Ins college 
the trust when the settlor^) consent to Its 
termination. Fowler v Lsnpher, lift Wash, 306, 
75 P.2d 132 (1936); Bogert, Trusts * Trustee^ 
f 1008 (2d ed 1962); 4 Scott on Trust* f 338 
(3d ed 1967), is Inapplicable to this cast b* 
cause appellant, one of the settlors, resisted 
termination 
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education part time on active duty and later 
as a civilian. In view of these facts, we 
cannot see how it can be said that the 
educational purposes of this trust have been 
fulfilled or that the appropriate and reason-
able duration for performance of this trust 
for "advanced education" has passed. Con-
sequently, the trust could not be terminat-
ed. Clayton v. Behle, supra; Lafferty v. 
Sheets, 175 Kan. 741, 267 P.2d 962 (1954); 
Closset v. Burtchaell, supra. 
For each of these two reasons, we hold 
that this trust could not be terminated on 
the evidence before the district court in this 
proceeding. 
» « /) 
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
At the hearing, appellant sought an order 
directing the payment of his attorney's fees 
from the corpus of the trust Appellant's 
attorney represented that he had expended 
16 hours in preparing to resist the proposed 
termination, plus his time in the hearing in 
the district court These fees were denied, 
and appellant challenges this on appeal. 
[1% 14] A trustee has the fiduciary duty 
And the concomitant power to defend the 
trust from the depletion of its assets by 
decrees of termination or invalidity. 
U.CA, 1958, § 75-7-402(1) and (3)(x) and 
0 ) ; In re Hart's Estate, 61 Cal.2d 819, 837 
R2d 78 (1959); Van Gorden v. hunt, 284 
IOWA 882,18 N.W^d 841 (1944). A trustee 
wb& ha# done so successfully is entitled to 
fifct* the corpus of the trust pay the reason-
Able attorney's fees incurred in that de-
fatfe. U.C.A., 1958, § 22-3-14(8Xa), § 75-
7-402^BXt); In re Hart's Estate, supra; 
Van Gorden v. Lunt, supra; Nelson v. Mer-
cantile Trust Co., Mo., 885 S.W.2d 167, 175 
(1960). As we said in Walker v. Walker, 17 
Utah 2d 63, 60, 404 P.2d 253 (1966), "a 
trustee is entitled to reimbursement for all 
expenses properly incurred in discharging 
the responsibilities of his trust." On re-
iftjind, the court should therefore review the 
fees for legal services rendered to the trust 
in this matter and order the payment of 
reasonable fees from the trust corpus. 
Insofar as it holds that no trust was 
created in the parties' interest in the Big 
Bear Property, including their interest in 
installments not paid as of February 8, 
1980, the decree of the district court is 
affirmed. In all other respects, the decree 
of the district court is reversed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. No costs 
awarded. 
HALL, C. J., and STEWART, J., concur. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissent-
ing): 
I concur that a trust was created as pay-
ments were received and that the court can 
modify the divorce decree to provide that 
no more payments should come into the 
trust. 
1 dissent from the balance of the holding 
of the majority opinion. I believe it to be 
error to require that the trust continue as 
to the funds on hand just because all the 
beneficiaries did not consent to its termina-
tion, or because its purpose was not ful-
filled. Under § 30-*-5, U.OA.1958, the 
district court has broad powers to change 
the funding of education for minor children 
from one source to another, or to discontin-
ue funding completely. (Incidentally, both 
parents here offered to personally pay any 
expenses if their children desired further 
education). The formal rules of trust law 
should not be applied to perpetuate the 
trust in view of the power of the court 
under $ 80-8-5 to terminate i t 
I also dissent from the statement in the 
majority opinion that the balance on hand, 
$5,914.28, has "vested" in the children. 
This amount belongs to the parents upon 
termination of the trust under the terms of 
their stipulation and the divorce decree en-
tered in 1973. 
TIBBS, District Judge, concurs in the 
opinion of HOWE, J. 
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Judgment creditor appealed from an 
order of the Fourth District Court, Du-
chesne County, Allen B. Sorensen, J., quash-
ing his execution upon judgment on ground 
that execution had not been issued within 
eight years after creditor had obtained 
judgment The Supreme Court, Howe, J., 
held that: (1) creditor could not have been 
prejudiced by not being present at hearing 
which resulted in granting of motion to 
quash execution and there was no abuse of 
discretion by trial court, and (2) after credi-
tor failed to comply with rule requiring that 
writ of execution issue on judgment within 
eight years after its entry, creditor was not 
entitled to additional year in which to ob-
tain writ because noncompliance was due to 
clerical error in stating on form of writ that 
judgment had been rendered in Duchesne 
County instead of Uintah County. 
Affirmed. 
Oaks, J., concurred specially and filed 
opinion. 
1. Execution *»163 
Judgment creditor could not have been 
prejudiced by not being present at hearing 
which resulted in granting of motion to 
quash execution and there was no abuse of 
discretion by trial court, where judgment 
debtors' counsel did not make any oral ar-
gument and case was decided by district 
court on basis of memoranda submitted by 
both counsel, as was creditor's original de-
sire, and creditor did not claim he could 
offer testimony showing that statute of 
limitations had been tolled. 
After judgment creditor failed to com-
ply with rule requiring that writ of execu-
tion issue on judgment within eight years 
after its entry, creditor was not entitled to 
additional year in which to obtain writ on 
ground that noncompliance was due to cler-
ical error in stating on form of writ that 
judgment had been rendered in Duchesne 
County instead of Uintah County. U.C.A. 
1958, 7&-HM0. 
Daniel A. Stanton, Stephen L. Johnston, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Dennis L. Draney, Roosevelt, for defend-
ants and respondents. 
HOWfc, Justice: 
Plaintiff appeals from an order quashing 
his execution upon a judgment on the 
ground that the execution had not been 
issued within eight years after he had 
obtained the judgment 
Plaintiff recovered a judgment against 
the defendants in the district court of Uin-
tah County on December 9, 1970. As au-
thorized by statute, the judgment was 
thereafter docketed in Duchesne County. 
Plaintiffs counsel allegedly mailed a form 
designated "Execution" to the clerk of the 
district court of Duchesne County on No-
vember 29, 1978 with the request that she 
sign and issue the same. Due to a clerical 
error, the form contained the heading "Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County" rather 
than "District Court of Duchesne County." 
The clerk in Duchesne County observed the 
error and returned the form to plaintiffs 
counsel. 
Plaintiffs counsel allegedly corrected the 
error and re-submitted the execution. It 
was again returned to him because of a 
further error in the form which recited that 
the judgment had been rendered in Du-
chesne County instead of in Uintah County. 
Counsel remedied the second error and for-
warded to the clerk the corrected form. 
She issued the execution about January 11, 
1979 and on March 23 the Duchesne County 
